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ONLINE PREDICTION WITH HISTORY-DEPENDENT EXPERTS: THE
GENERAL CASE
NADEJDA DRENSKA AND JEFF CALDER
School of Mathematics, University of Minnesota
Abstract. We study the problem of prediction of binary sequences with expert advice in the
online setting, which is a classic example of online machine learning. We interpret the binary
sequence as the price history of a stock, and view the predictor as an investor, which converts the
problem into a stock prediction problem. In this framework, an investor, who predicts the daily
movements of a stock, and an adversarial market, who controls the stock, play against each other
over N turns. The investor combines the predictions of n ≥ 2 experts in order to make a decision
about how much to invest at each turn, and aims to minimize their regret with respect to the
best-performing expert at the end of the game. We consider the problem with history-dependent
experts, in which each expert uses the previous d days of history of the market in making their
predictions. We prove that the value function for this game, rescaled appropriately, converges as
N → ∞ at a rate of O(N−1/6) to the viscosity solution of a nonlinear degenerate elliptic PDE,
which can be understood as the Hamilton-Jacobi-Issacs equation for the two-person game. As a
result, we are able to deduce asymptotically optimal strategies for the investor. Our results extend
those established by the first author and R.V. Kohn [13] for n = 2 experts and d ≤ 4 days of history.
1. Introduction
Prediction with expert advice refers to a subfield of online machine learning [9]. It models
real world situations where an investor uses expert advice to predict against (or play against) an
adversarial market. In particular, there is a multistep process where new information becomes
available at every time step and a learner (or investor) tries to incorporate this data into sequential
decisions. Pioneering works in the machine learning literature for prediction with expert advice
are Cover’s [10] and Hannan’s [19] papers. Various heuristic approaches that achieve good results
are contained in [8, 9, 18, 20, 24, 29, 30], and recent work has focused on provably optimal strategies
[5,12–14,18,30]. Typical applications of prediction with expert advice include stock price prediction,
portfolio optimization [16], self-driving car software [1], and algorithm boosting [16].
We consider the problem of prediction of binary sequences with expert advice in the online
setting. As in [13], we call the problem a stock prediction problem, since we think of the predictor
as an investor, and the binary sequence as the price history of a stock. We measure how effective
the investor’s strategy is through the notion of regret, which is the difference between the investor’s
performance and the performance of an expert. Prediction refers to the process by which the investor
combines the advice of multiple experts to make their own investment decision. The investor’s
goal is to minimizing regret with respect to the best performing expert, and thus obtain provably
good performance. An underlying assumption is that each expert may have a varying degree of
predictive ability. Indeed, some experts may be poor predictors, some may be adversarial, and
some may have inside information and perform above average often. The central question becomes
how to distinguish between the different experts and take advantage of the best performing ones.
In this paper, we take the commonly used assumption that the market is adversarial, and is thus
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another player in the game whose goal is to maximize the investor’s regret. In other words, we are
undertaking a worst case analysis.
We are interested in the case of history-dependent experts, in which each expert uses the previous
d days of market history to make their predictions. The case with two static experts—one optimistic
(who always bids +1) and one pessimistic (who always bids −1)—was first introduced by Thomas
Cover in 1966 [10]. Recent work has considered PDE scaling limits in the static case [2,25,31], and
the first author and R.V. Kohn [13] recently extended these results by allowing the two experts’
behaviors to be history-dependent. This extension introduces a second time scale, so the system
becomes ‘fast-slow’, with a ‘fast’ variable living on a discrete graph that describes the market history.
In order to handle this complication, [13] used ideas from graph theory and was able to completely
solve the problem for n = 2 experts and d ≤ 4 days of market history, and establish upper and
lower bounds for the value function for n = 2 and d ≥ 5.
In this paper, we extend the results of [13] to any number of experts n ≥ 2 and any number of days
d ≥ 1 of market history. In particular, we prove that the value function for the discrete prediction
problem converges, with quantitative rates, to the viscosity solution of a nonlinear degenerate elliptic
PDE. The PDE is the same as the one in [13] for n = 2 experts. We then use the solution of the PDE
to construct a provably asymptotically optimal strategy for the investor. A key feature of our work
is that the prediction problem is played over a graph, which encodes the ways in which the d days
of market history can transition at each step of the game. The graph is the d-dimensional de Bruijn
graph over 2 symbols (see Figure 1). The value function for the two-person game varies rapidly over
the graph, introducing a ‘fast’ variable, and in order to understand the long-time behavior of the
game, we have to understand how the fast variable averages out in the long run. Our proof utilizes
a k-step dynamic programming principle, instead of the usual 1-step version. For k sufficiently
large, the ‘fast’ variable averages out over the graph. It is possible to view our proof through the
lens of homogenization theory. Indeed, the local problem we identify in Section 3 is essentially a
cell problem, and describes the local oscillations of the value function. Our approach is completely
different from the one used in [13], which works with two linear programs related to movement on
the de Bruijn graph. In particular, the convergence rates that we obtain are worse by a cube root
from those established in [13] for n = 2 and d ≤ 4. We refer to Section 1.3 for a more thorough
comparison of our work with [13].
There are many other cases in the PDE literature where scaling limits of sequential decision
making result in elliptic or parabolic PDEs. Examples include the Kohn-Serfaty two-person game
for curvature motion [21], which can be extended to more general equations [22], and the stochastic
tug-of-war games for the p-Laplacian and ∞-Laplacian [27, 28]. These works have been followed
by many others (see e.g. [3, 4, 7, 23, 26]). In particular, our work is somewhat related to [7], in
which the second author and C.K. Smart prove that convex hull peeling has a continuum limit that
corresponds to affine invariant curvature motion. Convex hull peeling has an interpretation as a
two-person game played on a random point cloud. In [7], the authors also use a multistep approach,
where a large number of steps in the dynamic programming principle are required to ensure the
value function averages out locally.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.1 we describe the setup for prediction with
history dependent experts, and in Section 1.2 we state our main results. In Section 1.3 we give
an overview of the main ideas behind our proofs, and how they relate to the previous work by the
first author and R.V. Kohn [13]. In Section 2 we study the discrete value function and establish
basic properties, including the k-step dynamic programming principle. In Section 3, we study what
we call the local problem, which arises from Taylor expansion in the k-step dynamic programming
principle, and show that the local problem converges as k → ∞ at the rate O ( 1k). In Section 4,
we study the continuum PDE, proving existence of a unique linear growth viscosity solution under
mild assumptions, and establishing regularity in some special cases. Finally, in Section 5 we give
the proofs of our main results.
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1.1. Setup. We follow the setup in [13]. Assume we have n ≥ 2 experts making predictions about
the movement of a particular stock. The change in stock price on a daily basis is described by
a stream of binary data b1, b2, b3, . . . , bi, . . . with bi ∈ B := {−1, 1}, representing whether the
stock increased or decreased on day i. Every day, each of the n experts makes a prediction about
whether the stock will increase or decrease tomorrow. The investor uses these predictions to make
an investment, and this yields a corresponding gain or loss, depending on the movement of the
market bi. The game is played for a fixed number of days N , and the performance of the player is
compared against the best performing expert.
We assume the n experts each use a fixed publicly available algorithm to make their predictions,
and the predictions depend on the previous d days of history of stock movement. That is, on day
i, the experts use the data
(1.1) mi := (bi−d, bi−d+1, . . . , bi−1) ∈ Bd
to make a prediction about bi. The n expert predictions are taken to be fixed functions
(1.2) q1, . . . , qn : Bd → [−1, 1],
where qj(m) represents the prediction of expert j given stock history m ∈ Bd. The predictions are
real numbers in the interval [−1, 1], indicating the confidence each expert has in their prediction.
For notational convenience we write q := (q1, . . . , qn) : Bd → [−1, 1]n for the vector of all expert
predictions. We assume the predictions q(m) are publicly known for all m ∈ Bd. Given the expert
predictions q(mi) of bi, the investor decides on an investment fi ∈ [−1, 1], which can be interpreted
as an amount of the stock to buy or sell. The market then chooses bi ∈ B. If bi = 1, then the
investor gains fi, while if bi = −1 then the investor loses fi. Thus, the investor gains bifi on day i.
Similarly, the jth expert, were they to invest their prediction, would gain biqj(m
i).
The investor’s performance is measured by their regret against each expert. The regret relative
to an expert is the difference between the gains of the expert and that of the investor. We denote
by xi ∈ R the regret of the investor with respect to expert i, and write x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn for
the vector of regrets with respect to all experts. The change in regret with respect to expert j on
day i is thus bi(qj(m
i)− fi). In the context of prediction, one would say we are using the financial
loss function
L(fi, bi) := bi(qj(m
i)− fi).
For more general prediction problems, other losses for measuring how well the investor predicts bi
could be used (e.g., L(fi, bi) = |fi− bi|). We expect the results and techniques used in this paper to
apply to other losses as well, with some modifications. It is also important to point out that we do
not index the regret by the day i. In this framework, the regret is a state variable, and the change
in regret is realized as moving the game to a new state.
After the game is played for N days, the investor’s regret is evaluated with a payoff function
g : Rn → R. A common choice is g(x) = max{x1, . . . , xn}, which simply reports the regret
compared to the best performing expert. While the maximum regret is most commonly used in
practice, our anlaysis works for more general payoffs, satisfying reasonable conditions, so we proceed
in generality. The goal of the investor is to minimize g(x), where x is the regret vector at the end
of the game. The market is assumed to be adversarial, and is selecting the stock movements bi so
as to maximize g(x). Thus, we are undertaking a worst case analysis in this paper.
Underlying the two-player game is a directed graph that encodes the ways in which the history
mi can change from day to day. At each step i of the game, there are only two possible states for
the history window at step i+1, depending on whether bi = 1 or bi = −1. In order to describe this
graph we introduce some notation. For m = (m1, . . . ,md) ∈ Bd and b ∈ B we define m|b ∈ Bd by
(1.3) m|b := (m2,m3, . . . ,md, b).
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Figure 1. The de Bruijn Graph, d = 3
In this notation, the history window mi evolves according tomi+1 = mi|bi. We also write m+ = m|1
and m− = m| − 1. Each node in the graph is a possible state m ∈ Bd of the game’s history, and
there is a directed edge from m to m+ and from m to m− for every node m. This graph is called the
d-dimensional de Bruijn graph over 2 symbols. Figure 1 shows the 3-dimensional de Bruijn graph,
where we have written 0 in place of −1 to simplify the figure. The presence of this underlying de
Bruijn graph creates additional challenges in describing the optimal strategies and optimal value
for the game.
The discussion above was largely informal. To be precise, we now define the value function.
Definition 1.1 (Value function). Let g : Rn → R. Given N ∈ N, m ∈ Bd, and 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ N , the
value function VN (x, ℓ;m) is defined by VN (x, ℓ;m) = g(x) for ℓ = N , and
(1.4) VN (x, ℓ;m) = min|fℓ|≤1
max
bℓ=±1
min
|fℓ+1|≤1
max
bℓ+1=±1
· · · min
|fN−1|≤1
max
bN−1=±1
g
(
x+
N−1∑
i=ℓ
bi(q(m
i)− fi1)
)
for 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ N − 1, where mℓ = m and mi+1 = mi|bi for i = ℓ, . . . , N − 1.
Here, we use the notation 1 for the all ones vector 1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ Rn. The value of VN (x, ℓ;m)
is the payoff on the final day N , given the game starts on day ℓ with regret x ∈ Rn and history
m ∈ Bd, and both the investor and market play optimally. Notice there are, in fact, 2d value
functions, one for each m ∈ Bd.
1.2. Main results. We are interested in understanding the long-time behavior of the value func-
tions as N →∞, and the asymptotically optimal investor strategies. For this, we place the following
structural assumptions on the payoff.
There exists θg > 0 such that for all x ∈ Rn, v ∈ [0,∞)n, g(x+ v) ≥ g(x) + θg〈v,1〉,(G1)
For all x ∈ Rn, s > 0 we have g(sx) = sg(x).(G2)
We also place the following assumption on expert strategies.
For all m ∈ Bd, q(m) 6= 1 and q(m) 6= −1.(E1)
Assumption (E1) asks that the experts never all agree at +1 or −1. For example, if one expert
always predicts +1 while another always predicts −1, then (E1) holds. This assumption guarantees
that the constant ϑq defined by
(1.5) ϑq := min
m∈Bd
min
{
n∑
i=1
(1− qi(m)+),
n∑
i=1
(1− qi(m)−)
}
is strictly positive ϑq > 0, where a+ = max{a, 0} and a− = −min{a, 0}.
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To obtain a meaningful continuum limit, we must rescale VN appropriately. We define the rescaled
value function uN : R
n × [0, 1] × Bd → R by
(1.6) uN (x, t;m) :=
1√
N
VN (
√
Nx, ⌈Nt⌉;m).
Here, ⌈t⌉ denotes the smallest integer greater than t. The rescaling in (1.6) is parabolic rescaling,
and is due to the adversarial nature of the problem, which causes O(
√
N) regret to accumulate after
N steps of the game. We also define the upper and lower value functions u+N and u
−
N by
(1.7) u+N (x, t) = max
m∈Bd
uN (x, t;m) and u
−
N (x, t) = min
m∈Bd
uN (x, t;m).
Our main results, given below, show that u±N converge uniformly, with convergence rates, to the
solution of the continuum PDE
(1.8)

ut +
1
2d+1
∑
η∈Q(∇u)
〈∇2u η, η〉 = 0, in Rn × (0, 1)
u = g, on Rn × {t = 1},
where for p ∈ Rn the set Q(p) is given by
(1.9) Q(p) =
{
q(m)− 〈p, q(m)〉〈p,1〉 1 : m ∈ B
d
}
when 〈p,1〉 6= 0, and Q(p) = ∅ otherwise. Essentially, (1.8) is the limiting Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs
equation for the two player game. Since Q(p) ⊂ p⊥, (1.8) is a degenerate diffusion equation.
Our first result is the following continuum limit.
Theorem 1.2. Let n ≥ 2. Let g be uniformly continuous, and assume (G1), (G2) and (E1) hold.
Let u ∈ C(Rn × [0, 1]) be the unique viscosity solution of (1.8). As N →∞ we have
u±N −→ u uniformly on Rn × [0, 1].
Furthermore, if g ∈ C4(Rn) with [g]C4(Rn) < ∞, then there exists C1, C2 > 0 depending on n, θg,
and [g]C4(Rn), such that for all t ∈ [0, 1] and
(1.10) N ≥ max
{
(d+ 1)6
d2
,
C1d
ϑ3q
}
it holds that
sup
x∈Rn
|u±N (x, t)− u(x, t)| ≤ C2
(
(1− t)d2/3N−1/6 + d1/3N−1/3
)
.
We show in Section 4 that when g is uniformly continuous and (G1) holds, (1.8) has a unique
linear growth viscosity solution. We also recall the Ck(Rn) semi-norm of u is defined as
(1.11) [g]Ck(Rn) = sup
x∈Rn
max
1≤|α|=k
|Dαg(x)|.
It is also common in the literature on online learning to assume the payoff satisfies the following
translation property:
For all x ∈ Rn and s ∈ R, g(x+ s1) = g(x) + s.(G3)
When the translation property holds, the rate in Theorem 1.2 can be extended to Lipschitz continu-
ous payoffs g. This includes the commonly used payoff g(x) = max{x1, . . . , xn}, which corresponds
to measuring regret with respect to the best performing expert. For this, we need to place an
additional assumption on the expert strategies. We define r : Bd → Rn−1 by
(1.12) r(m) = (q1(m)− qn(m), . . . , qn−1(m)− qn(m)),
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and we assume
There exists 0 < λr ≤ 1 such that 1
2d+1
∑
m∈Bd
r(m)⊗ r(m) ≥ λrI,(E2)
where I is the (n − 1) × (n − 1) identity matrix. We recall that for symmetric matrices A and B,
the notation A ≥ B means that A−B is positive semi-definite.
In this case, we have the following result.
Theorem 1.3. Let n ≥ 2. Let g be Lipschitz continuous, and assume (G1), (G2), (G3), (E1)
and (E2) hold. Let u ∈ C(Rn × [0, 1]) be the unique viscosity solution of (1.8). Then there exists
C1, C2 > 0 depending only on n, such that for all t ∈ [0, 1] and
(1.13) N ≥ C1(d+ 1)
6
d2λr
it holds that
‖u±N − u‖L∞(Rn×[0,1]) ≤ C2Lip(g)
(
1 +
Lip(g)2
θ2gϑ
2
q
+ log
(
1 + d−1/3λ−1/6r N
5/6
))
λ−2/3r d
2/3N−1/6.
We recall the Lipschitz constant of g is given by
Lip(g) = sup
x,y∈Rn
x 6=y
|g(x) − g(y)|
|x− y| .
Several remarks are in order.
Remark 1.4. In the proofs of Theorems 1.2 and 1.3, we end up obtaining an asymptotically
optimal strategy for the investor. The proofs do not explicitly use the strategy; instead, our proofs
are concerned with the optimal value, given optimal strategies are employed. For reference, we
describe an asymptotically optimal investor strategy below, which is a byproduct of the proof of
Lemma 3.7 in Section 3.
Let the initial regret on day 1 be denoted x1 ∈ Rn, and the initial history window be denoted
m1 ∈ Bd. Let
xj = x1 +
j−1∑
i=1
bi(q(m
i)− fi1)
be the regret on day j, where mi+1 = mi|bi. Let 1 ≪ k ≪ N such that k divides evenly into N ,
and consider dividing the number of plays of the game N into blocks of size k. We describe the
strategy on the ℓth block fℓk+1, fℓk+2, . . . , f(ℓ+1)k. We compute the solution of (1.8) and set
p = ∇u(xℓk) and X = ∇2u(xℓk).
We define Hi : Bd → R by H0(m) = 0 for all m ∈ Bd and the recursion
Hi(m) = 1
2
〈Xξ(m), ξ(m)〉 + 1
2
(Hi−1(m+) +Hi−1(m−)) ,
for i ≥ 1, where
ξ(m) = q(m)− 〈p, q(m)〉〈p,1〉 1.
See Proposition 3.3 for more properties of Hi. Then for i = 1, . . . , k the investor chooses the strategy
(1.14) fℓk+i =
〈p, q(mℓk+i)〉+ ε
ℓk+i−1∑
j=ℓk+1
bj〈Xq(mℓk+i), q(mj)− 1fj〉+ ε
2
(Hk−i(mi+)−Hk−i(mi−))
〈p,1〉+ ε
ℓk+i−1∑
j=ℓk+1
bj〈X1, q(mj)− 1fj〉
,
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where we have set ε = N−1/2 for convenience. This investor strategy makes the market indifferent
(in an asymptotic sense) to bi = ±1. The proof of this is contained in Lemma 3.7. The amount of
accumulated regret after following this investor strategy for all k steps of the ℓth block is approxi-
mately Hk(m1). This turns out to correspond to a weighted average of 12〈Xξ(m), ξ(m)〉 over a de
Bruijn tree of depth k rooted at m1, and as k →∞ this tree averages out over the de Bruijn graph,
yielding (see Proposition 3.3)
1
k
Hk(m1) ∼ 1
2d+1
∑
m∈Bd
〈Xξ(m), ξ(m)〉.
Notice this is the same operator appearing in our main PDE (1.8). Any choice of 1 ≪ k ≪ N1/2
yields an asymptotically optimal strategy. In the proof of our main results, we optimize over the
choice of k, yielding k ∼ d1/3N1/6.
We also remark that the strategy (1.14) on the first step of a new block (i = 1) is given by
(1.15) fℓk+1 =
〈p, q(mℓk+1)〉
〈p,1〉 +
ε
2
(Hk−1(m1+)−Hk−1(m1−)
〈p,1〉
)
.
As we show in Proposition 3.3, the term
(1.16) Hk−1(m1+)−Hk−1(m1−)
is independent of k, as long as k ≥ d+1. This term is exactly the difference of weighted sums over
de Bruijn trees of depth k− 1 rooted at m1+ and m1− (we refer to Proposition 3.3 for more details).
We expect the strategy (1.15) may have some particular importance, and may be related to the
strategy used in the prior work [13]. △
Remark 1.5. We briefly remark on the roles of the hypotheses (G1), (G2), and (E1). First, (G2)
is only used to ensure the final time condition uN (x, 1;m) = g(x) holds. If instead of defining uN
as in (1.6), we use the alternative rescaled definition
uN (x, t;m) = min|f⌈Nt⌉|≤1
max
b⌈Nt⌉=±1
· · · min
|fN−1|≤1
max
bN−1=±1
g
(
x+N−1/2
N−1∑
i=ℓ
bi(q(m
i)− fi1)
)
,
then we can omit the hypothesis (G2). If (G2) does not hold, and we define uN as in (1.6), then
we expect a result similar to Theorem 1.2 to hold, provided we replace g in (1.8) with
g0(x) := lim
ε→0
εg
(x
ε
)
,
provided the limit exists. To obtain the same convergence rate as in Theorem 1.2, we would have
to assume a rate of convergence as ε→ 0 in the definition of g0 above.
Second, while the conditions (E1) and (G1) appear in the convergence rate in Theorem 1.2 through
the constants ϑq and θg, it appears these conditions are necessary even for the convergence u
±
N → u
without a rate. To see why, we show in Proposition 4.7 (ii) that (G1) implies that uxi ≥ θg > 0 for
all i. Combining this with (E1) we see that
−1 < 〈∇u, q(m)〉〈∇u,1〉 < 1
holds for all m ∈ Bd. Thus, when N is sufficiently large, so that ε = N−1/2 is sufficiently small, the
optimal investor strategy fi given in (1.14) (note p = ∇u) is guaranteed to be admissible; that is,
it lies in the interval fi ∈ [−1, 1]. If there are nodes m ∈ Bd in the de Bruijn graph where q(m) = 1
or q(m) = −1, then the optimal strategy (1.14) may sometimes be inadmissible for the investor. In
this case, the investor will be unable to render the market indifferent to bi = 1 or bi = −1, and as a
result, the market can exploit the investor and accumulate additional regret. The condition (E1) is
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not needed if we allow the investor more flexibility in their investment, and invest fi ∈ [−1−δ, 1+δ]
for some δ > 0.
We note that we still expect to see some kind of continuum limit result even when (E1) does not
hold, however, the limiting PDE (1.8) may have a different form. In particular, instead of an equal
weighting over all nodes in the de Bruijn graph, we expect that nodes with q(m) = 1 or q(m) = −1
may be more heavily weighted, indicating that these nodes contribute a higher amount of regret.
We also mention that (G1) is used to show that the PDE (1.8) has a unique viscosity solution,
although the weaker condition 〈∇g,1〉 ≥ θg > 0 is sufficient for this purpose. △
Remark 1.6. Notice in Theorem 1.3, the constants C1 and C2 depend only on the number of
experts n. In particular, the dependence on the dimension d of the de Bruijn graph is recorded
explicitly and is sublinear (i.e., d2/3) in the convergence rate, while polynomial in the condition
(1.13) on N . A similar comment is true for Theorem 1.2, though the constants in that theorem
depend additionally on regularity properties of g. △
Remark 1.7. It is not common in the literature on scaling limits for two-player games to obtain
convergence rates as in Theorems 1.2 and 1.3, due to a lack of regularity for the viscosity solution
of the limiting equation (1.8). In this case, the PDE (1.8) has a hidden geometric structure that
allows us to prove that the viscosity solution u is classical, in certain cases, with sufficient control on
its derivatives to obtain the convergence rates. In particular, the PDE (1.8) is a geometric equation
that describes the evolution of the level sets of u by a heat equation. In the right coordinate system,
the heat equation is linear and (E2) is exactly the corresponding uniform ellipticity condition. This
was first observed for n = 2 experts in the work of Zhu [31], and this observation also plays an
essential role in [13]. We refer to Theorems 4.12 and 4.14 for the general statements (for any n ≥ 2)
of this geometric structure.
In fact, when the translation property (G3) holds, it is straightforward to see where the additional
regularity comes from. Indeed, (G3) implies that u also satisfies the translation property (see
Proposition 4.7 (iii)) and so, formally speaking, 〈∇u,1〉 = 1. Differentiating again we obtain
∇2u1 = 0. Therefore, the equation (1.8) simplifies to the linear heat equation
(1.17)

ut +
1
2d+1
∑
m∈Bd
〈∇2u q(m), q(m)〉 = 0, in Rn × (0, 1)
u = g, on Rn × {t = 1}.
If
∑
m∈Bd q(m) ⊗ q(m) ≥ λI, then (1.17) is uniformly elliptic and u ∈ C∞(Rn × [0, 1)). We note
that the uniform ellipticity condition (E2) is for a different equation (see Theorem 4.12 and Remark
4.13) that is obtained by using the translation property to reduce the dimension to n − 1. The
condition (E2) is implied by uniform ellipticity of (1.17), and is hence a weaker condition. We also
note that (E2) implies that the vectors {r(m)}m∈Bd span Rn−1, and so a necessary condition for
(E2) to hold is that 2d ≥ n− 1. △
1.3. Overview and relation to prior work. We give here a high level overview of the ideas
behind the proofs of Theorems 1.2 and 1.3, and compare to the previous work of the first author
and R.V. Kohn [13].
We show in Proposition 2.3 that the rescaled value function uN satisfies the dynamic programming
principle
uN (x, t;m) = min|f |≤1
max
b=±1
uN (x+ εb(q(m)− 1f), t+ ε2;m|b),
where we write ε = N−
1
2 for convenience. The standard way to extract a limiting PDE from a
dynamic programming principle is to replace uN (x, t;m) by a smooth function u(x, t), independent
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of m, and Taylor expand the function u. Neglecting error terms, this yields
u(x, t) = min
|f |≤1
max
b=±1
{
u(x, t) + ε2ut(x, t) + bε〈∇u(x, t), δ〉 + ε
2
2
〈∇2u(x, t)δ, δ〉} ,
where δ = q(m)−1f . To simplify the discussion, let us assume the translation property (G3) holds.
As in Remark 1.7, this implies that the solution u of (1.8), or any candidate for the limit of uN ,
satisfies ∇2u1 = 0. This simplifies the dynamic programming principle to read
u = min
|f |≤1
max
b=±1
{
u+ ε2ut + bε〈∇u, q(m)− 1f〉+ ε
2
2
〈∇2u q(m), q(m)〉} ,
where we have dropped the dependence on (x, t). We can rearrange this to find that
(1.18) ut + min|f |≤1
max
b=±1
{
bε−1〈∇u, q(m)− 1f〉+ 1
2
〈∇2u q(m), q(m)〉} = 0.
From here, we see that the “optimal” choice for the market is b = sign(〈∇u, q(m) − 1f〉) and the
“optimal” investor strategy is
(1.19) f =
〈∇u, q(m)〉
〈∇u,1〉 .
Indeed, this strategy is admissible, i.e., f ∈ [−1, 1], since q(m) ∈ [−1, 1]n and (G1) implies uxi > 0
for all i. In fact, (1.19) is exactly a weighted average of the expert strategies, weighted by the partial
derivatives uxi . This choice sets sets the first term to be zero in the min-max in (1.18), which yields
(1.20) ut +
1
2
〈∇2u q(m), q(m)〉 = 0.
However, this PDE depends on the state m ∈ Bd on the de Bruijn graph, and we expect this
dependence to drop out as N → ∞. In fact, note that the PDE (1.17) is exactly the average of
(1.20) over Bd. This indicates that the investor strategy (1.19) is not, in fact, optimal.
To see why (1.19) is suboptimal, we note that (1.20) implies that this investor strategy accu-
mulates regret of 12〈∇2u q(m), q(m)〉 in each step of the game, independent of the choice made by
the market. Furthermore, by setting the first term in (1.18) to zero, this strategy gives the market
complete control over the trajectory of the game on the de Bruijn graph. The market will choose
the binary stream b1, b2, . . . , so as to traverse cycles on the de Bruijn graph that are most costly,
that is, where 12〈∇2u q(m), q(m)〉 is largest. Thus, unless all de Bruijn cycles have the same average
cost, the investor has some incentive to slightly modify (1.19) to counteract the market and limit
this behavior. In essence, we were not justified in dropping the state m from the one step dynamic
programming principle, and the optimal strategies must take into account more than one step of
the game.
In [13], the first author and R.V. Kohn took the ansatz that the optimal investor strategy has
the form
(1.21) fi =
〈∇u, q(m)〉
〈∇u,1〉 + εf
#
i ,
and looked for correctors f#i that slightly modified (1.20) so that all cycles on the de Bruijn graph
were equally expensive. Choosing an O(ε) perturbation allows f#i to interact directly with the
second order O(ε2) terms in the Taylor expansion above. The authors of [13] showed that the
correctors f#i should be chosen as the solution to a particular linear program over the de Bruijn
graph with inequality constraints. There are linear programs for both the investor and the market,
leading to upper and lower bounds for the value function for n = 2 and all d ≥ 1. When the values
of the two linear programs (for the market and investor) coincide, the upper and lower bounds
coincide, the strategies are provably optimal, and the authors establish convergence of the value
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functions. Currently, it is only known that the values coincide for n = 2 and d ≤ 4, and this is
obtained though explicitly solving the linear programs and checking. The linear programs become
exponentially more complicated as d grows, and finding explicit solutions is a challenging open
problem for d ≥ 5. We expect that the investor strategy we identified in (1.14) is closely related to
this linear program, and may provide clues for solving it explicitly for d ≥ 5.
In this paper, we take an entirely different approach, and in the end, we essentially show that the
ansatz (1.21) is correct for all n ≥ 2 and d ≥ 1. We say essentially because our optimal strategy
(see the discussion in Remark 1.4 and Eq. (1.14)) has the form
fi =
〈∇u, q(m)〉
〈∇u,1〉 +O(kε),
where k → ∞ as ε → 0. While k can increase to infinity arbitrarily slowly, the optimal value (for
the best convergence rate) is k ∼ ε−1/3. We compare this with the ansatz (1.21), which implicitly
assumes f#i is bounded, independent of ε. It is an open problem to determine if the ansatz (1.21)
is correct in general, with the sharp O(ε) perturbation.
Our approach follows more closely to the classical viscosity solutions approach to optimal control.
Instead of looking for optimal market and investor strategies and using these to prove convergence
of the value function, we focus our attention directly on the value function itself, and use ideas
from homogenization theory to show how the value function locally averages out over the de Bruijn
graph. To briefly summarize our approach, instead of taking one step in the dynamic programming
principle, we take a large number of steps k. This results in the k-step dynamic programming
principle (proved in Proposition 2.3)
uN (x, t;m) = min|f1|≤1
max
b1=±1
· · · min
|fk|≤1
max
bk=±1
uN
(
x+ ε
k∑
i=1
bi(q(m
i)− 1fi), t+ ε2k;mk+1
)
,
where ε = N−1/2. We proceed in the same way as above, and replace uN by a smooth function u
and Taylor expand to obtain
u(x, t) = min
|f1|≤1
max
b1=±1
· · · min
|fk|≤1
max
bk=±1
{
u(x, t) + kε2ut(x, t) + ε
k∑
i=1
bi〈∇u(x, t), δi〉
+
ε2
2
k∑
i,j=1
bibj
〈∇2u(x, t)δi, δj〉},
where m1 = m and mi+1 = mi|bi for i = 1, . . . , k, and δi = q(mi)− 1fi. We can rearrange this to
find that
(1.22) ut +
1
k
min
|f1|≤1
max
b1=±1
· · · min
|fk|≤1
max
bk=±1
ε−1
k∑
i=1
bi〈∇u, δi〉+ 1
2
k∑
i,j=1
bibj
〈∇2u δi, δj〉
 = 0.
This allows us to reduce the problem to a repeated two-player game with a quadratic payoff
function—the repeated min-max problem in (1.22). We establish asymptotics for the optimal value
of this game as k → ∞ and ε → 0, and find that the initial state m averages out of the equation.
This allows us to obtain a PDE that is independent of the state m, provided that we take k →∞
as N → ∞. Along the way, we obtain an asymptotically optimal strategy for the investor, which
renders the market indifferent, but this is not directly used in the proofs.
In the previous work [13], the authors proved convergence rates of O(ε) in the context of Theorem
1.2 and O(ε| log(ε)|) in the context of Theorem 1.3, for n = 2 and d ≤ 4, while also obtaining upper
and lower bounds on the value function for n = 2 and d ≥ 5. Our convergence rates of O(ε1/3) and
O(ε1/3| log(ε)|) are worse, due to the fact that our k-step dynamic programming principle (1.22)
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leads to larger errors from Taylor expansion, on the order of O(k3ε3) instead of O(ε3), and the fact
that we must send k →∞ as N →∞ to ensure the initial state m averages out in (1.22). We show
in Theorem 3.2 that the state m averages out at a rate of O
(
1
k
)
, and this must be balanced with
the Taylor expansion errors to obtain our final convergence rate. It would be interesting to combine
our observations of the optimal strategy in (1.14) with the methods used in [13] in an attempt to
improve the rates in Theorems 1.2 and 1.3 to match those in [13] when d ≥ 5 and n ≥ 3. We expect
this will require some slight modifications to the strategy (1.14) so that the gradient p and Hessian
X are updated at each step of the game, instead of once per k-block.
Let us also mention that, at first sight, the PDE (1.8) and the PDE identified in [13] appear quite
different. We show here that they are equivalent when n = 2, and thus (1.8) is the appropriate
generalization for n ≥ 3. When n = 2, we write p⊥ = (−p2, p1) for p ∈ R2, and we note that for
any m ∈ Bd and p ∈ R2 with 〈p,1〉 > 0 we have
q(m)− 〈p, q(m)〉〈p,1〉 1 =
q2(m)− q1(m)
〈p,1〉 p
⊥.
Therefore, the equation (1.8) becomes
ut + C
# 〈∇2u∇u⊥,∇u⊥〉
〈∇u,1〉2 = 0,
where
C# =
1
2d+1
∑
m∈Bd
(q2(m)− q1(m))2.
This is the same as the PDE identified in [13] (see, e.g., [13, Eq. (5.1)]), except that in [13], the
equation is written in the rotated coordinates (ξ, η) = (x1−x2, x1 +x2) (we note that the variables
ξ and η have completely different meanings in our paper, as we do not use the rotated coordinates).
2. Analysis of the discrete two-player game
We prove several properties of the discrete game, including monotonicity, translation invariance,
and discrete regularity. It will be convenient to extend the concatenation notation defined in (1.3)
to allow for concatenation of longer symbols. We thus use the notation m|s for concatenation of
m ∈ Bd and s ∈ Bj, with the result being an element of Bd ending with s. If j < d then
m|s = (mj+1,mj+2, . . . ,md, s1, s2, . . . , sj),
and if j ≥ d then
m|s = (sj−d+1, sj−d+2, . . . , sj).
The notation m|s|b means (m|s)|b, and so on. For simplicity we write m+ := m|1 andm− := m|−1.
We note that m|s is exactly the state arrived at by starting at node m on the de Bruijn graph and
following the edges defined by s1, s2, . . . , sj .
A number of properties of the value function VN follow directly from Definition 1.1.
Lemma 2.1. Let N ≥ 1, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ N , and m ∈ Bd. The following hold.
(i) If (G1) holds, then for all x ∈ Rn and v ∈ [0,∞)n we have
VN (x+ v, ℓ;m) ≥ VN (x, ℓ;m) + θg〈v,1〉.
(ii) If (G3) holds, then for all x ∈ Rn and t > 0
VN (x+ t1, ℓ;m) = VN (x, ℓ;m) + t.
(iii) If g is Lipschitz continuous then for all x, y ∈ Rn we have
|VN (x, ℓ;m)− V (y, ℓ;m)| ≤ Lip(g)|x − y|.
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Proof. The proofs of (i) and (ii) follow directly from Definition 1.1. For (iii) we have
VN (x, ℓ;m) = min|fℓ|≤1
max
bℓ=±1
· · · min
|fN−1|≤1
max
bN−1=±1
g
(
x+
N−1∑
i=ℓ
bi(q(m
i)− fi1)
)
≤ min
|fℓ|≤1
max
bℓ=±1
· · · min
|fN−1|≤1
max
bN−1=±1
[
g
(
y +
N−1∑
i=ℓ
bi(q(m
i)− fi1)
)
+ Lip(g)|x − y|
]
= VN (y, ℓ;m) + Lip(g)|x− y|,
which completes the proof. 
A key property of the value function is the dynamic programming principle. We record below a
k-step version for VN .
Proposition 2.2 (Dynamic Programming Principle). For any N ≥ 1, x ∈ Rn, m ∈ Bd, k ≥ 1 and
ℓ ≤ N − k it holds that
VN (x, ℓ;m) = min|f1|≤1
max
b1=±1
· · · min
|fk|≤1
max
bk=±1
VN
(
x+
k∑
i=1
bi(q(m
i)− 1fi), ℓ+ k;mk+1
)
,
where m1 = m and mi+1 = mi|bi for i = 1, . . . , k.
Proof. By Definition 1.1 we have
VN (x, ℓ;m) = min|fℓ|≤1
max
bℓ=±1
· · · min
|fN−1|≤1
max
bN−1=±1
g
(
x+
∑N−1
i=ℓ bi(q(m˜
i)− fi1)
)
where m˜ℓ = m and m˜i+1 = m˜i|bi for i = ℓ, . . . , N − 1. Noting that
VN
(
x+
∑ℓ+k−1
i=ℓ bi(q(m
i)− fi1), ℓ+ k; m˜ℓ+k
)
= min
|fk+ℓ|≤1
max
bk+ℓ=±1
· · · min
|fN−1|≤1
max
bN−1=±1
g
(
x+
∑N−1
i=k bi(q(m˜
i)− fi1)
)
,
we have that
VN (x, ℓ;m) = min|fℓ|≤1
max
bℓ=±1
· · · min
|fℓ+k−1|≤1
max
bℓ+k−1=±1
VN
(
x+
∑ℓ+k−1
i=ℓ bi(q(m˜
i)− fi1), ℓ+ k; m˜ℓ+k
)
.
Re-indexing i we have
VN (x, ℓ;m) = min|f1|≤1
max
b1=±1
· · · min
|fk|≤1
max
bk=±1
VN
(
x+
∑k
i=1 bi(q(m
i)− 1fi), ℓ+ k;mk+1
)
,
where m1 = m and mi+1 = mi|bi for i = 1, . . . , k, which completes the proof. 
We immediately obtain a dynamic programming principle for the rescaled value function uN
defined in (1.6).
Proposition 2.3 (Rescaled Dynamic Programming Principle). For N ≥ 1, m ∈ Bd, k ≥ 1 and
0 ≤ t ≤ 1−N−1k, it holds that
uN (x, t;m) = min|f1|≤1
max
b1=±1
· · · min
|fk|≤1
max
bk=±1
uN
(
x+N−
1
2
k∑
i=1
bi(q(m
i)− 1fi), t+N−1k;mk+1
)
.
where m1 = m and mi+1 = mi|bi for i = 1, . . . , k.
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Proof. By the definition of uN (1.6) we have
VN (x, ℓ;m) =
√
NuN (N
−1/2x,N−1ℓ;m).
By Proposition 2.2 we thus have
uN (N
−1/2x,N−1ℓ;m) = min
|f1|≤1
max
b1=±1
· · · min
|fk|≤1
max
bk=±1
uN
(
N−1/2x+N−1/2
∑k
i=1 bi(q(m
i)− 1fi), N−1ℓ+N−1k;mk+1
)
for any x ∈ Rn, m ∈ Bd, k ≥ 1 and ℓ ≤ N − k, where mi are given as in Proposition 2.2. Setting
y = N−1/2x and t = N−1ℓ we obtain
uN (y, t;m) = min|f1|≤1
max
b1=±1
· · · min
|fk|≤1
max
bk=±1
uN
(
y +N−
1
2
k∑
i=1
bi(q(m
i)− 1fi), t+N−1k;mk+1
)
.
Since this also holds for any t ∈ [0, 1] with ⌈Nt⌉ = ℓ, the proof is complete. 
Remark 2.4. Notice that the dynamic programming principle given in Propositions 2.2 and 2.3
are coupled systems of 2d equations involving all 2d value functions. In particular, the states m on
the left hand side and mk+1 on the right hand side, are in general different states on the de Bruijn
graph. This causes some difficulties with obtaining a Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation directly from
the dynamic programming principle, and is the reason we consider a k-step dynamic programming
principle, instead of the usual 1-step dynamic programming principle. As we show in Section 3
below, when k is large enough, the initial state m in the k-step dynamic programming principle is
forgotten (it averages out over the de Bruijn graph), and this allows us to decouple the 2d dynamic
programming principle equations into a single averaged equation. △
3. The local problem
We now study a local problem that arises from the k-step dynamic programming principle iden-
tified in Proposition 2.3. We make the following definition.
Definition 3.1 (Local problem). Let X ∈ S(n)1, p ∈ Rn, k ≥ 1, ε > 0, and m ∈ Bd. The local
problem is given by
(3.1) Lk,ε(X, p,m) = min|f1|≤1 maxb1=±1 · · · min|fk|≤1 maxbk=±1
ε−1
k∑
i=1
bi〈p, δi〉+ 1
2
k∑
i,j=1
bibj〈Xδi, δj〉
 ,
where m1 = m and mi+1 = mi|bi for i = 1, . . . , k, and
(3.2) δi = q(m
i)− 1fi.
We will write Lk,ε in place of Lk,ε(X, p,m) when the values of X, p and m are clear from context.
The motivation for the local problem was given in Section 1.3. In particular, the local problem is
the main operator appearing in (1.22) with p = ∇u and X = ∇2u, and so (1.22) can be written as
ut +
1
k
Lk,ε(∇2u,∇u,m) = 0.
We show in this section that the initial state m averages out of the local problem Lk,ε(X, p,m)
as k → ∞ at a rate of O ( 1k). This allows us to obtain a PDE that is independent of the initial
state m. The situation is similar to how small scale oscillations in a cell problem average out in
homogenization theory. In fact, the local problem is very much analogous to a cell problem from
1S(n) denotes the space of n× n real symmetric matrices.
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homogenization, except that the oscillations in the local problem occur in an auxiliary variable
living on a discrete graph (the de Bruijn graph).
Our main result in this section is the following convergence rate for the local problem.
Theorem 3.2 (Local problem). Assume (E1) holds. Let X ∈ S(n), p ∈ (0,∞)n, m ∈ Bd, k ≥ d+1,
ε > 0, and set γp = min1≤i≤n pi. Then there exists C, c > 0, depending only on n, such that whenever
‖X‖kε ≤ c ϑqγp we have
(3.3)
∣∣∣∣∣∣1kLk,ε(X, p,m) − 12d+1
∑
η∈Q(p)
〈Xη, η〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ C‖X‖
(
d
k
+ ‖X‖γ−1p kε
)
.
Here, ‖X‖ is the operator norm of X given by
‖X‖ = sup{|Xη| : η ∈ Rn and |η| = 1}.
We also recall ϑq > 0 is defined in (1.5).
The remainder of this section is devoted to proving Theorem 3.2. For this, we require some
additional notation. For p ∈ Rn and m ∈ Bn we define
(3.4) ξ(p,m) = q(m)− 〈p, q(m)〉〈p,1〉 1.
For p ∈ Rn, X ∈ S(n) and m ∈ Bn, we define Hk(X, p,m) by H0(X, p,m) = 0 and
(3.5) Hk(X, p,m) = 1
2
〈Xξ(p,m), ξ(p,m)〉 + 1
2
(Hk−1(X, p,m+) +Hk−1(X, p,m−))
for k ≥ 1. We will often make the dependence on X and p implicit and write ξ(m) = ξ(p,m) and
Hk(m) = Hk(X, p,m), to reduce the notational burden. Notice that
−〈p,1〉 ≤ 〈p, q(m)〉 ≤ 〈p,1〉,
and so ξ(m) ∈ [−2, 2]n. This implies that |ξ(m)| ≤ 2√n.
We record some important properties of Hk(m).
Proposition 3.3. There exists C > 0 depending only on n such that the following hold.
(i) For all m ∈ Bd, H1(m) = 12 〈Xξ(m), ξ(m)〉 and for k ≥ 2
Hk(m) = 1
2
〈Xξ(m), ξ(m)〉 +
k−1∑
ℓ=1
1
2ℓ+1
∑
s∈Bℓ
〈Xξ(m|s), ξ(m|s)〉.
(ii) For all m ∈ Bd and k ≥ 0 we have
|Hk(X, p,m+)−Hk(X, p,m−)| ≤ Cd‖X‖.
(iii) For all m ∈ Bd and k ≥ d+ 1 we have∣∣∣∣∣∣Hk(X, p,m) − k2d+1
∑
η∈Q(p)
〈Xη, η〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Cd‖X‖.
Remark 3.4. Proposition 3.3 (i) shows that Hk(m) is exactly a weighted average of the quantities
ζ(m) := 12〈Xξ(m), ξ(m)〉 over a de Bruijn tree of depth k rooted at m. See Figure 2 for an
illustration. In the figure we replaced −1 with 0 for convenience. The statements (ii) and (iii) follow
from the fact that only the first d layers of the tree depend on the root node m, and so the root
node averages out when k ≫ d. Furthermore, all contributions to the difference Hk(m+)−Hk(m−)
of depth d+ 1 and higher exactly cancel out. △
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Figure 2. Summing over a de Bruijn tree
Proof. We first prove (i). Define H˜k by H˜1(m) = 12 〈Xξ(m), ξ(m)〉 and
H˜k(m) := 1
2
〈Xξ(m), ξ(m)〉 +
k−1∑
ℓ=1
1
2ℓ+1
∑
s∈Bℓ
〈Xξ(m|s), ξ(m|s)〉.
We will show that H˜k satisfies the recursion (3.5), and so Hk = H˜k. It is clear that (3.5) holds for
k = 2, so we may assume k ≥ 3. Then we compute
1
2
(
H˜k−1(m+) + H˜k−1(m−)
)
=
1
4
(〈Xξ(m+), ξ(m+)〉+ 〈Xξ(m−), ξ(m−)〉)
+
1
2
k−2∑
ℓ=1
1
2ℓ+1
∑
s∈Bℓ
(〈Xξ(m+|s), ξ(m+|s)〉+ 〈Xξ(m−|s), ξ(m−|s)〉)
=
1
4
∑
s∈B1
〈Xξ(m|s), ξ(m|s)〉 +
k−2∑
ℓ=1
1
2ℓ+2
∑
s∈Bℓ+1
〈Xξ(m|s), ξ(m|s)〉
=
k−1∑
ℓ=1
1
2ℓ+1
∑
s∈Bℓ
〈Xξ(m|s), ξ(m|s)〉
= H˜k(m)− 1
2
〈Xξ(m), ξ(m)〉,
which completes the proof of (i).
To prove (ii), we note that m+|s = m−|s for s ∈ Bℓ with ℓ ≥ d. Therefore, we have
Hk(m+)−Hk(m−) = 1
2
(〈Xξ(m+), ξ(m+)〉 − 〈Xξ(m−), ξ(m−)〉)
+
min{k−1,d}∑
ℓ=1
1
2ℓ+2
∑
s∈Bℓ
(〈Xξ(m+|s), ξ(m+|s)〉 − 〈Xξ(m−|s), ξ(m−|s)〉) .
Therefore, there exists C, depending only on n, such that for all m ∈ Bd and k ≥ 0 we have
|Hk(m+)−Hk(m−)| ≤ Cd‖X‖.
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To prove (iii), we note that for s ∈ Bℓ with ℓ ≥ d
m|s = (sℓ−d+1, . . . , sℓ)
is independent of m. Therefore for k ≥ d+ 1 we have
Hk(m) = 1
2
〈Xξ(m), ξ(m)〉 +
d−1∑
ℓ=1
1
2ℓ+1
∑
s∈Bℓ
〈Xξ(m|s), ξ(m|s)〉 +
k−1∑
ℓ=d
2ℓ−d
2ℓ+1
∑
s∈Bd
〈Xξ(s), ξ(s)〉
=
k − d
2d+1
∑
s∈Bd
〈Xξ(s), ξ(s)〉 +O(d‖X‖)
=
k
2d+1
∑
η∈Q(p)
〈Xη, η〉 +O(d‖X‖),
which completes the proof. 
A main technical tool in the proof of Theorem 3.2 is the computation of the exact optimality
conditions for one step of the min-max problem.
Lemma 3.5. Let ε > 0, S : B → R, and let h1, h2 : [−1, 1] → R be smooth. Consider the min-max
problem
(3.6) M := min
|f |≤1
max
b=±1
{bh1(f) + ε(S(b) + h2(f))} .
Assume that
(3.7) h1(−1) > ε
2
(S(−1) − S(1))) > h1(1),
and
(3.8) h′1(f) + ε|h′2(f)| < 0 for all f ∈ [−1, 1].
Then (3.6) is minimized by f∗ ∈ [−1, 1] satisfying
(3.9) h1(f
∗) =
ε
2
(S(−1)− S(1))
and the optimal value of the min-max problem is
(3.10) M = εh2(f
∗) +
ε
2
(S(1) + S(−1)).
Proof. Write
M+(f) = h1(f) + ε(S(1) + h2(f)),
and
M−(f) = −h1(f) + ε(S(−1) + h2(f)).
Then
M = min
|f |≤1
max {M+(f),M−(f)} .
Since M+ and M− are continuous, the minimum is attained at some f∗ ∈ [−1, 1].
We claim that M+(f
∗) = M−(f∗), from which (3.9) and (3.10) immediately follow. The proof of
the claim is split into two steps.
1. We first show that M+(f
∗) ≤ M−(f∗). Assume to the contrary that M+(f∗) > M−(f∗). We
first observe that
M−(1)−M+(1) = −2h1(1)− ε(S(1) − S(−1)) > 0
due to (3.7). Therefore f∗ < 1. Now, note that
M ′+(f) = h
′(f) + εh′2(f) < 0
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for all f ∈ [−1, 1], due to (3.8). Thus, there exists δ > 0, sufficiently small, so that M+(f∗ + δ) <
M+(f
∗) and M−(f∗ + δ) < M+(f∗ + δ) (by continuity). It follows that
max{M+(f∗ + δ),M−(f∗ + δ)} = M+(f∗ + δ) < M+(f∗) = max{M+(f∗),M−(f∗)},
which contradicts the minimality of f∗.
2. We now show that M+(f
∗) ≥ M−(f∗). As before, assume to the contrary that M+(f∗) <
M−(f∗), and observe that
M+(−1)−M−(−1) = 2h1(−1)− ε(S(−1) − S(1)) > 0,
due to (3.7). Therefore f∗ > −1. Now, note that
M ′−(f) ≤ −h′1(f) + εh′2(f) > 0
for all f ∈ [−1, 1], due to (3.8). Thus, for small δ > 0 we have M−(f∗ − δ) < M−(f∗) and
M+(f
∗ − δ) < M−(f∗ − δ). It follows that
max{M+(f∗ − δ),M−(f∗ − δ)} = M−(f∗ − δ) < M−(f∗) = max{M+(f∗),M−(f∗)},
which contradicts the minimality of f∗. 
Finally, we require a technical proposition.
Proposition 3.6. Assume (E1) holds and let p ∈ (0,∞)n. Then
(3.11) 〈p,1〉 − |〈p, q(m)〉| ≥ ϑqγp for all m ∈ Bd,
where γp = min1≤i≤n pi and ϑq > 0 is given in (1.5).
Proof. Note that
−
n∑
i=1
piqi(m)− ≤ 〈p, q(m)〉 ≤
n∑
i=1
piqi(m)+,
where a+ = max{a, 0} and a− = −min{a, 0}. Therefore
|〈p, q(m)〉| ≤ max
{
n∑
i=1
piqi(m)+,
n∑
i=1
piqi(m)−
}
,
and we have
〈p,1〉 − |〈p, q(m)〉| ≥ min
{
n∑
i=1
pi(1− qi(m)+),
n∑
i=1
pi(1− qi(m)−)
}
≥ γpmin
{
n∑
i=1
(1− qi(m)+),
n∑
i=1
(1− qi(m)−)
}
= γpϑq,
which completes the proof. 
The following lemma shows that the cell problem Lk,ε is well-approximated by Hk, and essentially
completes the proof of Theorem 3.2.
Lemma 3.7. Assume (E1) holds. Let X ∈ S(n), p ∈ (0,∞)n, m ∈ Bd, k ≥ 1, ε > 0, and set
γp = min1≤i≤n pi. Then there exists C, c > 0, depending only on n, such that whenever ‖X‖(k +
d)ε ≤ c ϑqγp we have
(3.12) |Lk,ε(X, p,m) −Hk(X, p,m)| ≤ C‖X‖2γ−1p (k + d)kε.
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Proof. Recall that δi = q(m
i)− 1fi. We claim that for every ℓ = 0, . . . , k we have
Lk,ε= min|f1|≤1 maxb1=±1 · · · min|fk−ℓ|≤1 maxbk−ℓ=±1
ε−1
k−ℓ∑
i=1
bi〈p, δi〉+ 1
2
k−ℓ∑
i,j=1
bibj〈Xδi, δj〉+Hℓ(mk−ℓ+1)
(3.13)
+O(‖X‖2γ−1p (k + d)ℓε),
where when ℓ = k, the statement reduces to
Lk,ε = Hℓ(m) +O(‖X‖2γ−1p (k + d)kε),
which completes the proof of the theorem.
We prove (3.13) by induction. The base case of ℓ = 0 is given by the definition of the local
problem (3.1), since H0(m) = 0 for all m ∈ Bd. For the inductive step, let us assume (3.13) is true
for some ℓ ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}. Then we can write
Lk,ε = min|f1|≤1 maxb1=±1 · · · min|fk−ℓ−1|≤1 maxbk−ℓ−1=±1
ε−1
k−ℓ−1∑
i=1
bi〈p, δi〉+ 1
2
k−ℓ−1∑
i,j=1
bibj〈Xδi, δj〉+ sℓ
(3.14)
+O(‖X‖2γ−1p (k + d)ℓε),
where
sℓ = ε
−1 min
|fk−ℓ|≤1
max
bk−ℓ=±1
{
bk−ℓ〈p, δk−ℓ〉+ ε
k−ℓ−1∑
i=1
bk−ℓbi〈Xδk−ℓ, δi〉+ ε
2
〈Xδk−ℓ, δk−ℓ〉+Hℓ(mk−ℓ+1)
}
.
Note that if ℓ = k− 1, then there are no min-max terms nor summations in (3.14) and Lk,ε = sk−1.
Similarly, there is no summation term in sℓ when ℓ = k − 1.
Recall thatmk−ℓ+1 = mk−ℓ|bk−ℓ. Hence, we will apply Lemma 3.5 with S(bk−ℓ) = Hℓ(mk−ℓ|bk−ℓ),
h1(fk−ℓ) = 〈p, δk−ℓ〉+ ε
k−ℓ−1∑
i=1
bi〈Xδk−ℓ, δi〉 and h2(fk−ℓ) = 1
2
〈Xδk−ℓ, δk−ℓ〉.
We need to check conditions (3.7) and (3.8) in Lemma 3.5. We have by Proposition 3.6 that
h1(1) = 〈p, q(mk−ℓ)− 1〉+ ε
k−ℓ−1∑
i=1
bi〈Xδk−ℓ, δi〉
≤ −ϑqγp + ε
k−ℓ−1∑
i=1
|Xδk||δi|
≤ −ϑqγp + C‖X‖(k − ℓ− 1)ε,
and
h1(−1) = 〈p, q(mk−ℓ−1) + 1〉+ ε
k−ℓ−1∑
i=1
bi〈Xδk−ℓ, δi〉 ≥ γpϑq − C‖X‖(k − ℓ− 1)ε.
By Proposition 3.3 (ii) we have
|S(1) − S(−1)| = |Hℓ(mk−ℓ+ )−Hℓ(mk−ℓ− )| ≤ Cd‖X‖.
Thus, to ensure that (3.7) holds we require that
(3.15) C‖X‖(k − ℓ+ d− 1)ε ≤ ϑqγp.
For (3.8), note that
h′1(fk−ℓ) = −〈p,1〉 − ε
k−ℓ−1∑
i=1
bi〈X1, δi〉,
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and
h′2(fk−ℓ) = −〈Xq(mk−ℓ),1〉+ fk−ℓ〈X1,1〉.
Therefore
h′1(fk) ≤ −nγp + C‖X‖(k − ℓ− 1)ε and |h′2(fk)| ≤ C‖X‖.
Since ϑq < 1, we find that (3.15) is also sufficient for (3.8) to hold, and (3.15) follows from our
assumption that ‖X‖(k + d)ε ≤ c ϑqγp.
Thus, we can apply Lemma 3.5 to find that the optimal f∗k−ℓ in the definition of sℓ satisfies
h1(f
∗
k−ℓ) =
ε
2
(S(−1) − S(1)) = ε
2
(Hℓ(mk−ℓ− )−Hℓ(mk−ℓ+ )),
and
(3.16) sℓ = h2(f
∗
k−ℓ) +
1
2
(Hℓ(mk−ℓ+ ) +Hℓ(mk−ℓ− )).
Therefore
(3.17) f∗k−ℓ =
〈p, q(mk−ℓ)〉+ ε∑k−ℓ−1i=1 bi〈Xq(mk−ℓ), δi〉+ ε2 (Hℓ(mk−ℓ+ )−Hℓ(mk−ℓ− ))
〈p,1〉+ ε∑k−ℓ−1i=1 bi〈X1, δi〉 .
To obtain an asymptotic expression for f∗k−ℓ, note that by Proposition 3.3 (ii) we have
|h1(f∗k−ℓ)| ≤ Cd‖X‖ε
and so
|〈p, q(mk−ℓ)− 1f∗k−ℓ〉| ≤ C‖X‖(k − ℓ+ d− 1)ε ≤ C‖X‖(k + d).
It follows that
f∗k−ℓ =
〈p, q(mk−ℓ)〉
〈p,1〉 +O(‖X‖γ
−1
p (k + d)ε),
and so
h2(f
∗
k−ℓ) =
1
2
〈X(q(mk−ℓ)− 1f∗k−ℓ), q(mk−ℓ)− 1f∗k−ℓ〉
=
1
2
〈Xξ(mk−ℓ), ξ(mk−ℓ)〉+O(‖X‖2γ−1p (k + d)ε).
By (3.5) and (3.16) we have
sℓ = Hℓ+1(mk−ℓ) +O(‖X‖2γ−1p (k + d)ε).
Inserting this into (3.14) completes the proof by induction. 
Proof of Theorem 3.2. The proof simply combines Proposition 3.3 (iii) and Lemma 3.7. 
Remark 3.8. If the translation property (G3) holds then some of the computations in Lemma 3.7
can be simplified. Indeed, in this case Proposition 4.7 (iii) shows that the solution u(x, t) of the
PDE (1.8) also satisfies the translation property
u(x+ s1, t) = u(x, t) + s.
It follows that 〈∇u(x, t),1〉 = 1 and thus ∇2u(x, t)1 = 0. Thus, we may restrict attention in the
local problem to Hessians X ∈ S(n) that satisfy X1 = 0. Therefore the local problem (3.1) becomes
Lk,ε = min|f1|≤1 maxb1=±1 · · · min|fk|≤1 maxbk=±1
ε−1
k∑
i=1
bi〈p, δi〉+ 1
2
k∑
i,j=1
bibj〈Xq(mi), q(mj)〉
 .
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In particular, the optimization over fi concerns the linear term only and the proof simplifies greatly.
In this case, Theorem 3.2 simplifies to read∣∣∣∣∣∣Lk,ε(X, p,m) − k2d+1
∑
m∈Bd
〈Xq(m), q(m)〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Cd‖X‖.
△
4. Analysis of the continuum PDE
In this section we analyze the continuum PDE (1.8). In particular, we show that under relatively
few assumptions, the equation enjoys the comparison principle and has a unique viscosity solution.
Under additional assumptions on the expert strategies and the payoff, we furthermore show that
the viscosity solution is smooth. The proof relies on interpreting (1.8) as a geometric heat equation.
We also establish basic properties of solutions to (1.8) that will be useful later in the paper.
We write u ∈ Ci,j(Rn × [a, b]) to mean that u is continuous in (x, t), x 7→ u(x, t) is i-times
continuously differentiable, and t 7→ u(x, t) is j-times continuously differentiable, on the domain
R
n × [a, b].
4.1. Viscosity solution theory. We recall the definition of viscosity solution of the parabolic
PDE
(4.1) ut + F (∇2u,∇u) = 0 in Rn × (0, 1).
We let USC(O) (resp. LSC(O)) denote the set of upper (resp. lower) semicontinuous functions on
a subset O of Euclidean space. We also denote by u∗ and u∗ the upper and lower semicontinuous
envelopes of u, respectively.
Definition 4.1. We say u ∈ USC(Rn × [0, 1]) is a viscosity subsolution of (4.1) if for all ϕ ∈
C∞(Rn × R) and (x, t) ∈ Rn × (0, 1) such that u− ϕ has a local maximum at (x, t) we have
(4.2) ϕt(x, t) + F (∇2ϕ(x, t),∇ϕ(x, t)) ≥ 0.
Similarly, we say v ∈ LSC(Rn×[0, 1]) is a viscosity supersolution of (4.1) if for all ϕ ∈ C∞(Rn×R)
and (x, t) ∈ Rn × (0, 1) such that u− ϕ has a local minimum at (x, t) we have
(4.3) ϕt(x, t) + F (∇2ϕ(x, t),∇ϕ(x, t)) ≤ 0.
We say u ∈ C(Rn × [0, 1]) is a viscosity solution of (4.1) if u is both a viscosity sub- and
supersolution.
We note that the inequalities in (4.2) and (4.3) are flipped, compared to standard definitions
in [11], due to the fact that (4.1) is a final-time value problem. Also, we note that sometimes the
superjet and subjet definitions are used in place of the test function definition (see [11]). The two
definitions are equivalent when F is continuous (see, e.g., [6]).
Since we work on an unbounded domain, we must restrict the class of super and sub-solutions to
those with linear growth.
Definition 4.2. We say u : Rn × [0, 1] has linear growth if there exists C > 0 such that |u(x, t)| ≤
C(1 + |x|) for all (x, t) ∈ Rn × [0, 1].
We note that our main equation (1.8) is discontinuous when 〈p,1〉 = 0, due to the definition of
Q(∇u), given in (1.9). We work with sub- and supersolutions that are strictly monotone increasing
so as to avoid the discontinuity at 〈p,1〉 = 0.
Definition 4.3. Let θ > 0. We say that u : Rn × [0, 1] is θ-increasing if
(4.4) u(x+ s1, t) ≥ u(x, t) + θs for all (x, t) ∈ Rn × [0, 1], s ≥ 0.
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Under this definition, (G1) implies that g is nθg-increasing.
Let ε > 0 and consider the modified PDE
(4.5) ut +
1
2d+1
∑
η∈Qε(∇u)
〈∇2u η, η〉 = 0 in Rn × (0, 1),
where Qε(∇u) is defined by
(4.6) Qε(p) =
{
q(m)− 〈p, q(m)〉
max{〈p,1〉, ε}1 : m ∈ B
d
}
.
When u is θ-increasing for θ ≥ ε, solutions of (4.5) and (1.8) are equivalent, as we show below. It
is often more useful to work with the modified equation (4.5), since (4.5) is continuous in both ∇u
and ∇2u.
We first record a comparison principle for (1.8) for linear-growth sub- and supersolutions that
are θ-increasing.
Theorem 4.4. Assume g is uniformly continuous. Let u ∈ USC(Rn× [0, 1]) by a viscosity subsolu-
tion of (1.8) and let v ∈ LSC(Rn× [0, 1]) be a viscosity supersolution of (1.8). Suppose there exists
C, θ > 0 such that u and v are θ-increasing and u(x, t) ≤ C(1 + |x|) and v(x, t) ≥ −C(1 + |x|) for
all (x, t) ∈ Rn × [0, 1]. Then if
u(x, 1) ≤ g(x) ≤ v(x, 1)
for all x ∈ Rn, then u ≤ v on Rn × [0, 1].
Proof. We claim that for 0 < ε ≤ θ, u is a viscosity subsolution of (4.5) and v is a viscosity
supersolution of (4.5). Indeed, we will show u is a subsolution; the proof that v is a supersolution
is similar. Let ϕ ∈ C∞(Rn ×R) and (x0, t0) ∈ Rn × (0, 1) such that u− ϕ has a local maximum at
(x0, t0). It follows that
u(x, t)− ϕ(x, t) ≤ u(x0, t0)− ϕ(x0, t0)
for (x, t) near (x0, t0). Setting t = t0 and x = x0 + s1 for sufficiently small s, we have
ϕ(x0 + s1, t0)− ϕ(x0, t0) ≥ u(x0 + s1, t0)− u(x0, t0) ≥ θs,
since u is θ-increasing. Dividing by s and sending s→ 0+ we have
〈∇ϕ(x0, t0),1〉 ≥ θ.
Hence, if ε ≤ θ, we have Qε(∇ϕ(x0, t0)) = Q(∇ϕ(x0, t0)), which verifies the subsolution condition.
It is a standard argument (see, e.g., [15, Section 10.2]) that u and v are viscosity sub- and
supersolutions of (4.5) on the extended domain Rn×[0, 1). Since u and v have at most linear growth,
we can apply a standard comparison principle from viscosity solution theory (see, e.g., [17, Theorem
2.1]) to find that u ≤ v on Rn × [0, 1], which completes the proof. 
We can establish existence of a linear growth viscosity solution with the Perron method.
Theorem 4.5. Assume g is uniformly continuous and θ-increasing for θ > 0. Then there exists
a viscosity solution u ∈ C(Rn × [0, 1]) of (1.8) that has linear growth and is θ-increasing. If
v ∈ C(Rn × [0, 1]) is any other viscosity solution of (1.8) that has linear growth and is θ-increasing
for any θ > 0, then u = v.
Remark 4.6. From now on, we will refer to the viscosity solution of (1.8) to mean the unique
linear growth θ-increasing viscosity solution. △
Proof. We again work with the modified equation (4.5) with ε = θ. We will use the Perron method
with barrier functions
w±δ (x, t) := gδ(x)±Kδ(1− t)± ‖g − gδ‖L∞(Rn),
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where δ > 0 and gδ := ηδ ∗ g, with ηδ a standard mollifier with bandwidth δ. Since g is uniformly
continuous, it in fact has linear growth. Thus, the barriers w±δ are smooth functions with linear
growth, and are θ-increasing, since g is θ-increasing. For sufficiently large Kδ > 0, w
+
δ is a classical
supersolution of (4.5) and w−δ is a subsolution of (4.5). We also clearly have
w−δ (x, 1) ≤ g(x) ≤ w+δ (x, 1) for all x ∈ Rn.
Since g is uniformly continuous, we have
lim
δ→0+
‖g − gδ‖L∞(Rn) = 0.
We now use the Perron method (see, e.g., [11] or [6, Chapter 7]) on the modified equation (4.5).
In particular, we define
F =
{
v ∈ USC(Rn × [0, 1]) : v is a linear growth viscosity subsolution of (4.5),
and v(x, 1) ≤ g(x) for all x ∈ Rn
}
,
and the Perron function u(x) = sup{v(x) : v ∈ F}. The set F is nonempty, since w−δ ∈ F for all
δ > 0. Therefore, it is a standard result that u∗ is a viscosity subsolution of (4.5) (see [6, Lemma
7.1]). By the comparison principle for (4.5), we have v ≤ w+δ for all δ > 0. Since w−δ ∈ F for all
δ > 0, we also have v ≥ w−δ . Therefore w−δ ≤ u ≤ w+δ for all δ > 0, and since w+δ is continuous, we
have w−δ ≤ u∗ ≤ w+δ . In particular, u∗ has linear growth and for all x ∈ Rn
u∗(x, 1) ≤ lim
δ→0
w+δ (x, 1) = g(x).
Therefore u∗ ∈ F and so u = u∗. It is also a standard result [6, Lemma 7.2] that u∗ is a viscosity
supersolution of (4.5). Since u ≥ w−δ we have u∗ ≥ w−δ , due to continuity, and so
u∗(x, 1) ≥ lim
δ→0
w−δ (x, 1) = g(x).
Since w−1 ≤ u∗ ≤ u, we see that u∗ has linear growth, and by the comparison principle for (4.5) we
have u ≤ u∗. The opposite inequality is true by definition, and so u = u∗ = u∗ is the unique linear
growth viscosity solution of (4.5) satisfying u(x, 1) = g(x).
To see that u is a viscosity solution of (1.8), we simply need to show that u is θ-increasing, due
to the argument at the start of the proof of Theorem 4.4. To see this, define u(x, t) = u(x+ s1, t).
Then u is a viscosity solution of (4.5) satisfying u(x, 1) = g(x+ s1). Since g is θ-increasing we have
u(x, 1) = g(x+ s1) ≥ g(x) + θs.
By the comparison principle for (4.5) we have u ≥ u+ θs, which establishes that u is θ-increasing.
The uniqueness statement follows from the comparison principle (Theorem 4.4). 
We now establish some basic properties enjoyed by the solution of (1.8).
Proposition 4.7. Assume g is uniformly continuous and θ-increasing. Let u ∈ C(Rn × [0, 1]) be
the viscosity solution of (1.8). The following hold.
(i) If g is Lipschitz continuous, then for each t ∈ [0, 1] the mapping x 7→ u(x, t) is Lipschitz
continuous. In particular
|u(x, t) − u(y, t)| ≤ Lip(g)|x − y|
for all x, y ∈ Rn and t ∈ [0, 1].
(ii) If (G1) holds, then
u(x+ v, t) ≥ u(x) + θg〈v,1〉
for all x ∈ Rn, v ∈ [0,∞)n and t ∈ [0, 1].
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(iii) If (G3) holds, then
u(x+ s1, t) = u(x, t) + s
for all s > 0 and (x, t) ∈ Rn × [0, 1].
Proof. To prove (i), let v ∈ Rn and define
w(x, t) = u(x+ v, t) + Lip(g)|v|.
Then it is immediate to check that w is a viscosity solution of (1.8) satisfying
w(x, 1) = u(x+ v, 1) + Lip(g)|v| = g(x+ v) + Lip(g)|v| ≥ g(x).
Therefore, by Theorem 4.4 we have u ≤ w, and so
u(x)− u(x+ v, t) ≤ Lip(g)|v|.
for all x, v ∈ Rn and t ∈ [0, 1]. Setting v = y − x completes the proof.
To prove (ii), fix v ∈ [0,∞)n and define w(x, t) = u(x + v, t) − θg〈v,1〉. Then w is a viscosity
solution of (1.8) satisfying
w(x, 1) = g(x+ v)− θg〈v,1〉 ≥ g(x)
due to (G1). By Theorem 4.4 we have w(x, t) ≥ u(x, t), which completes the proof.
The proof of (iii) is similar. We define w(x, t) = u(x+ s1, t)− s and show that w solves the same
equation (1.8). By uniqueness w = u. 
It turns out that the equation (1.8) is geometric. That is, the equation is unchanged by a
relabeling of its level sets. In fact, the level sets evolve according to a linear heat equation, as we
show in Section 4.2.
Lemma 4.8. Let u ∈ USC(Rn× [0, 1]) be a θ-increasing viscosity subsolution of (1.8). Let Ψ : R→
R be smooth with Ψ′ > 0. Then w(x, t) := Ψ(u(x, t)) is a viscosity subsolution of (1.8).
Proof. Let ϕ ∈ C∞(Rn × R) and (x0, t0) ∈ Rn × (0, 1) such that w − ϕ has a local maximum at
(x0, t0). We may assume w(x0, t0) = ϕ(x0, t0). Then for some r > 0
w(x, t) ≤ ϕ(x, t) whenever |x− x0| ≤ r and |t− t0| < r.
Define ψ = Ψ−1(ϕ). Since Ψ and Ψ−1 are strictly increasing, we have u(x0, t0) = ψ(x0, t0) and
u(x, t) ≤ ψ(x, t) whenever |x− x0| ≤ r and |t− t0| < r.
Therefore u− ψ has a local maximum at (x0, t0). Since u is θ-increasing, we have
(4.7) 〈∇ψ(x0, t0),1〉 ≥ θ > 0,
as in the proof of Theorem 4.4. Thus, by the viscosity subsolution property for u we have
ψt(x0, t0) +
1
2d+1
∑
η∈Q(p)
〈∇2ψ(x0, t0) η, η〉 ≥ 0,
where p = ∇ψ(x0, t0). Note we have
ϕt(x0, t0) = Ψ
′(u(x0, t0))ψt(x0, t0), ∇ϕ(x0, t0) = Ψ′(u(x0, t0))p,
and
∇2ϕ(x0, t0) = Ψ′(u(x0, t0))∇2ψ(x0, t0) + Ψ′′(u(x0, t0))p⊗ p.
Therefore
ϕt(x0, t0) +
1
2d+1
∑
η∈Q(p)
〈∇2ϕ(x0, t0)η, η〉 ≥ Ψ
′′(u(x0, t0))
2d+1
∑
η∈Q(p)
|〈p, η〉|2.
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Since Q(p) ⊂ p⊥, the right hand side vanishes, so we obtain
ϕt(x0, t0) +
1
2d+1
∑
η∈Q(p)
〈∇2ϕ(x0, t0)η, η〉 ≥ 0.
By (4.7) we have 〈p,1〉 ≥ θ > 0, and so
Q(p) = Q
(
(Ψ(u(x0, t0)))
−1∇ϕ(x0, t0)
)
= Q(∇ϕ(x0, t0)),
which completes the proof. 
Remark 4.9. An analogous statement to Lemma 4.8 holds for supersolutions. That is, if u ∈
LSC(Rn × [0, 1]) is a θ-increasing viscosity supersolution of (1.8) then w := Ψ(u) is also a viscosity
supersolution. △
4.2. Classical solutions. Under some conditions on the payoff g and the expert strategies, the
viscosity solution u of (1.8) has additional regularity and is sometimes a smooth classical solution.
This stems from the observation made in Lemma 4.8 that the PDE is geometric. It turns out that,
in the right coordinate system, the level sets of the solution u evolve by a linear heat equation that
is in some cases uniformly elliptic.
To see the geometric nature of (1.8), we make a change of coordinates as follows:
(4.8)
{
yi = xi − xn, (1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
yn = x1 + · · ·+ xn.
That is, we define the matrix
(4.9) R =

1 0 0 · · · 0 −1
0 1 0 · · · 0 −1
0 0 1 · · · 0 −1
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 0 · · · 1 −1
1 1 1 · · · 1 1

,
and make the change of variables y = Rx. The inverse coordinate transformation is easily obtained
as 
xi = yi +
1
n
yn − 1
n
n−1∑
i=1
yi, (1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
xn =
1
n
yn − 1
n
n−1∑
i=1
yi.
In these new coordinates, we now decompose the payoff g into its level-surfaces.
Proposition 4.10. Assume g is Lipschitz continuous and θ-increasing. Define g(y) = g(R−1y).
Then there exists a Lipschitz continuous function h0 : Rn → R such that
(4.10) g(y1, y2, . . . , yn−1, h0(y1, . . . , yn−1, s)) = s
holds for all y ∈ Rn−1 and s ∈ R. Furthermore, the following hold:
(i) For all (y, s) ∈ Rn−1 × R we have
√
nLip(g)−1 ≤ h0s(y, s) ≤ nθ−1,
(ii) If (G3) holds then for all y ∈ Rn and s ∈ R
h0(y1, . . . , yn−1, s) = yn − ng(y) + ns,
(iii) If g ∈ Ck(Rn) then h0 ∈ Ck(Rn), and [h0]Ck(Rn) depends only on [g]Ck(Rn) and θ.
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Remark 4.11. The function y 7→ h0(y, s) is a parametrization of the level set {g = s} in the form
yn = h
0(y, s). △
Proof. The proof follows from the implicit function theorem. Notice that (G1) implies
(4.11) gyn(y) =
1
n
〈∇g(R−1y),1〉 ≥ 1
n
θ > 0.
We also have gyn(y) ≤ 1√nLip(g). It follows that for every s ∈ R and y ∈ Rn−1, there is a unique
h0 ∈ R such that
g(y1, y2, . . . , yn−1, h0) = s.
This defines the function h0 = h0(y, s). Due to (4.11) the implicit function theorem guarantees that
h0 is Lipschitz continuous on Rn. This establishes the existence of h0.
To prove (i), we differentiate (4.10) in s to find
gyn(y, h
0(y, s))h0s(y, s) = 1,
and apply the bounds 1nθ ≤ gyn ≤ 1√nLip(g) proved above.
To prove (ii), we note that h0 satisfies
(4.12) h0(y1, . . . , yn−1, g(y)) = yn
for all y ∈ Rn, s ∈ R. Since (G3) holds we have 〈∇g,1〉 = 1, and thus gyn = 1n and h0s = n.
Combining this with (4.12) yields
yn = h
0(y1, . . . , yn−1, g(y)) = h0(y1, . . . , yn−1, 0) + ng(y),
Therefore
h0(y1, . . . , yn−1, 0) = yn − ng(y).
Since h0(y, s) = h0(y, 0) + ns, the claim follows.
The proof of (iii) follows from the implicit function theorem. 
Our first regularity result shows that the level sets {u(x, t) = s} evolve by a linear heat equation.
When the translation property (G3) and (E2) hold, this yields a representation formula for the
solution of (1.8), and we can use the parabolic smoothing from this interpretation to show that
u ∈ C∞.
Theorem 4.12. Assume (E2) and (G3) hold, and let g be Lipschitz continuous and θ-increasing.
Then the viscosity solution u of (1.8) is given by
(4.13) u(x, t) = h(x1 − xn, . . . , xn−1 − xn, t) + 1
n
(x1 + · · · + xn),
where h ∈ C∞(Rn × [0, 1)) is the solution of the heat equation
(4.14)

ht +
1
2d+1
∑
m∈Bd
〈∇2hr(m), r(m)〉 = 0, in Rn−1 × (0, 1)
h(y, 1) = g(y, 0), for y ∈ Rn−1,
and g(y) = g(R−1y). In particular, u ∈ C∞(Rn × [0, 1)) and
(4.15)

|uξξ(x, t)| ≤ CLip(g)√
(1− t)λr
, |uξξξ(x, t)| ≤ CLip(g)
(1− t)λr ,
|ut(x, t)| ≤ CLip(g)√
1− t , and |utt(x, t)| ≤
CLip(g)
(1− t)3/2 ,
hold for all ξ ∈ Rn with |ξ| = 1 and all (x, t) ∈ Rn × [0, 1).
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In the theorem statement, we use the notation uξξ = 〈∇2uξ, ξ〉 and uξξξ =
∑n
i,j,k=1 uxixjxkξiξjξk.
We also recall that r(m) is defined in (1.12).
Proof. Let A be defined as follows:
(4.16) A =
1
2d+1
∑
m∈Bd
r(m)⊗ r(m).
By (E2) we have A ≥ λrI, so (4.14) is uniformly elliptic, and h ∈ C∞(Rn × [0, 1)). We note that
(4.14) is a nondivergence form equation, which can be written as
ht + Tr(A∇2h) = 0.
Thus, h is given by the solution formula
(4.17) h(y, t) =
∫
Rn
ΦA(y − z, 1− t)g(z, 0) dz,
where ΦA is the heat kernel given by
(4.18) ΦA(y, t) =
1
(4πt)n/2|A|1/2 exp
(
−〈A
−1y, y〉
4t
)
.
We can differentiate (4.17) to obtain the following estimates: There exists C > 0 such that for all
(y, t) ∈ Rn × [0, 1) and all ξ ∈ Rn−1 with |ξ| = 1
(4.19)

|hξξ(y, t)| ≤ CLip(g)√
(1− t)λr
, |hξξξ(y, t)| ≤ CLip(g)
(1− t)λr ,
|ht(y, t)| ≤ CLip(g)√
1− t , and |htt(y, t)| ≤
CLip(g)
(1− t)3/2 .
We now show that u solves (1.8). To see this, first note that uxi = hyi +
1
n for i = 1, . . . , n − 1
and
uxn = −(hy1 + · · ·+ hyn−1) +
1
n
.
Therefore
〈∇u(x, t),1〉 = ux1 + ux2 + · · ·+ uxn = 1,
and it follows that ∇2u(x, t)1 = 0 and 1T∇2u(x, t) = 0. Since q(m) = (r(m), 0) + qn(m)1 for all
m ∈ Bd, we thus have
〈∇2u(x, t)q(m), q(m)〉 =
n−1∑
i,j=1
uxixj (x, t)ri(m)rj(m)
=
n−1∑
i,j=1
hyiyj(x1 − xn, . . . , xn−1 − xn, t)ri(m)rj(m)
= 〈∇2hr(m), r(m)〉.
Since ut = ht we find that u satisfies
(4.20) ut +
1
2d+1
∑
m∈Bd
〈∇2u q(m), q(m)〉 = 0.
Each η ∈ Q(∇u) is of the form
η = q(m)− 〈∇u, q(m)〉〈∇u,1〉 1 = q(m)− 〈∇u, q(m)〉1,
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for m ∈ Bd, and so ∑
η∈Q(∇u)
〈∇2u η, η〉 =
∑
m∈Bd
〈∇2u q(m), q(m)〉.
Therefore
ut +
1
2d+1
∑
η∈Q(∇u)
〈∇2u η, η〉 = 0.
Finally, we check the final condition u(x, 1) = g(x). As in the proof of Proposition 4.10 (ii) we have
gyn =
1
n , and so
u(x, 1) = g(x1 − xn, . . . , xn−1 − xn, 0) + 1
n
(x1 + · · ·+ xn)
= g
(
x1 − xn, . . . , xn−1 − xn, 1n(x1 + · · ·+ xn)
)
= g(x),
which completes the proof. 
Remark 4.13. Notice that in the proof of Theorem 4.12, we showed that u solves the linear heat
equation (4.20). This depends crucially on the translation property (G3) holding. In this case, we
can replace (E2) with the condition that
(4.21) B :=
1
2d+1
∑
m∈Bd
q(m)⊗ q(m) ≥ θI
for some θ > 0, and the results of Theorem 4.12 continue to hold. However, we claim that (4.21)
implies (E2), and so the condition (E2) is more general. To see this, assume (4.21) holds, and note
that
q(m) = (r(m), 0) + qn(m)1.
Let ξ ∈ Rn−1 and choose ξn = −(ξ1 + · · ·+ ξn−1) so that 〈1, (ξ, ξn)〉 = 0. Then
〈q(m), (ξ, ξn)〉Rn = 〈r(m), ξ〉Rn−1 .
Therefore, for A given by (4.16) we have
〈Aξ, ξ〉Rn−1 =
1
2d+1
∑
m∈Bd
|〈r(m), ξ〉Rn−1 |2
=
1
2d+1
∑
m∈Bd
|〈q(m), (ξ, ξn)〉Rn |2
= 〈B(ξ, ξn), (ξ, ξn)〉Rn−1 ≥ θ(|ξ|2 + |ξn|2) ≥ θ|ξ|2,
which establishes the claim. △
When the translation property (G3) does not hold, the situation is more complicated. Following
similar ideas to Theorem 4.12, we show below that the level sets {u(x, t) = s} evolve by the same
heat equation. However, we loose the parabolic smoothing across level sets in this case, and thus
we require additional regularity for g.
Theorem 4.14. Assume g ∈ C4(Rn), g is θ-increasing, and let u ∈ C(Rn × [0, 1]) be the viscosity
solution of (1.8). Then, u ∈ C4,2(Rn× [0, 1)) with [u(·, t)]C4(Rn) and [u(x, ·)]C2([0,1]) depending only
on θ and [g]C4(Rn) for all (x, t) ∈ Rn × [0, 1).
Proof. The proof is split into several steps.
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1. For ε > 0, define the function hε : R
n−1 × [0, 1] × R→ R so that for every s ∈ R the function
(y, t) 7→ hε(y, t, s) is the solution of the linear heat equation
(4.22)

hε,t +
1
2d+1
∑
m∈Bd
〈∇2hεr(m), r(m)〉+ ε∆hε = 0, in Rn−1 × (0, 1)
hε(y, 1, s) = h
0(y, s), for y ∈ Rn−1,
where h0 is defined in Proposition 4.10. We will often drop the dependence on ε for notational
convenience. As in the proof of Theorem 4.12, the solution of (4.22) is given by
(4.23) h(y, t, s) =
∫
Rn
ΦA+εI(y − z, 1− t)h0(z, s) dz.
By Proposition 4.10, h0 ∈ C4(Rn), and so h ∈ C4(Rn × [0, 1)). Furthermore, we can differentiate
formula (4.23) to obtain for all (y, t, s) ∈ Rn−1 × [0, 1] × R the following estimates, independent of
ε > 0:
(4.24)

|Dα(y,s)h(y, t, s)| ≤ ‖Dαh0‖L∞(Rn), 1 ≤ |α| ≤ 4
|ht(y, t, s)| ≤ C‖D2yh0‖L∞(Rn),
|htt(y, t, s)| ≤ C‖D4yh0‖L∞(Rn).
We can also differentiate (4.23) in s and apply Proposition 4.10 to obtain
(4.25)
√
nLip(g)−1 ≤ hs(y, t, s) ≤ nθ−1,
for all (y, t) ∈ Rn−1 × [0, 1] and s ∈ R.
2. By (4.25), for every ε > 0 and (y, t) ∈ Rn × [0, 1] there exists a unique vε ∈ R such that
hε(y1, . . . , yn−1, t, vε) = yn. This defines a function vε : Rn × [0, 1]→ R that satisfies
(4.26) hε(y1, . . . , yn−1, t, vε(y, t)) = yn
for all (y, t) ∈ Rn × [0, 1]. We again drop the subscript ε for convenience. By (4.25) and the
implicit function theorem, v ∈ C4(Rn × [0, 1)). We can differentiate (4.26) and use (4.24) and
Proposition 4.10 (iii) to find that [v(·, t)]C4(Rn) and [v(y, ·)]C2([0,1]) are bounded depending only on
θ and [g]C4(Rn), and are in particular independent of ε > 0. We also compute
hs(y1, . . . , yn−1, t, v(y, t))vyn (y, t) = 1,
from which we obtain
(4.27) 0 <
1
n
θ ≤ vyn(y, t) ≤
1√
n
Lip(g).
Finally, we note that v also satisfies
(4.28) v(y1, . . . , yn−1, h(y1, . . . , yn−1, t, s), t) = s
for all (y, t) ∈ Rn × [0, 1] and s ∈ R.
3. We now derive a PDE satisfied by v. Differentiating (4.28) in yi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 we have
(4.29) vyi + vynhyi = 0,
and differentiating in t yields
(4.30) vt + vynht = 0.
Note that in all formulas, we evaluate at (y, t) ∈ Rn × [0, 1) and set s = v(y, t). Differentiating
(4.29) in yj yields
vyiyj + vyiynhyj + (vyjyn + vynynhyj )hyi + vynhyiyj = 0.
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Multiply by v2yn on both sides and use (4.29) to obtain
v2ynvyiyj − vynvyiynvyj − (vynvyjyn − vynynvyj )vyi + v3ynhyiyj = 0,
which simplifies to
(4.31) v2ynvyiyj − vyn(vyiynvyj + vyjynvyi) + vynynvyivyj + v3ynhyiyj = 0.
Let ξ ∈ Rn with 〈ξ,∇v〉 = 0. This implies that
n−1∑
i=1
ξivyi = −ξnvyn .
Multiply by ξiξj on both sides of (4.31), sum over 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n − 1, and use the identity above to
obtain
v2yn
n−1∑
i,j=1
vyiyjξiξj + 2v
2
yn
n−1∑
i=1
vyiynξiξn + v
2
ynvynynξ
2
n + v
3
yn
n−1∑
i,j=1
hyiyjξiξj = 0.
It follows that whenever 〈ξ,∇v〉 = 0 we have
(4.32) 〈∇2v ξ, ξ〉 = −vyn
n−1∑
i,j=1
hyiyjξiξj.
We define Q(p) ⊂ p⊥ by
(4.33) Q(p) =
{
Rq(m)− 〈p,Rq(m)〉
pn
en : m ∈ Bd
}
.
Let ξ ∈ Q(∇v) and m ∈ B such that
(4.34) ξ = Rq(m)− 〈p,Rq(m)〉
pn
en.
By the definition of R we have
ξi = qi(m)− qn(m) = ri(m)
for all i ≤ n− 1. Since 〈ξ,∇v〉 = 0, we have by (4.32) that
(4.35) 〈∇2v ξ, ξ〉 = −vyn
n−1∑
i,j=1
hyiyjri(m)rj(m) = −vyn〈∇2h r(m), r(m)〉.
We multiply (4.22) by −vyn and use vt = −vynht to obtain
vt − vyn
1
2d+1
∑
m∈Bd
〈∇2h r(m), r(m)〉 − εvyn∆h = 0.
We substitute (4.35) in the above and use that vyn |∆h| ≤ C, with C independent of ε, to obtain
(4.36) vt +
1
2d+1
∑
ξ∈Q(∇v)
〈∇2v ξ, ξ〉 = O(ε).
To check the final time condition, we note that by (4.26) evaluated at t = 1 we have
h0(y1, . . . , yn−1, v(y, 1)) = yn.
Comparing this with (4.12) in the proof of Proposition 4.10, we see that v(y, 1) = g(y) = g(R−1y).
4. Define uε(x, t) = vε(Rx, t), and compute
(4.37) ∇xuε(x, t) = RT∇yvε(y, t) and ∇2xuε(x, t) = RT∇2yvε(y, t)R.
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If follows that 〈∇2xuε η, η〉 = 〈∇2yvεRη,Rη〉. Set ξ = Rη so that
〈∇2yvεξ, ξ〉 = 〈∇2xuεR−1ξ,R−1ξ〉.
where ξ ∈ Q(∇v). We claim that R−1Q(p) = Q(RT p), where Q is given in (1.9). To see this, let
ξ ∈ Q(p) and m ∈ Bd so that (4.34) holds. We write
R−1ξ = q(m)− 〈p,Rq(m)〉〈p, en〉 R
−1en
= q(m)− 〈R
T p, q(m)〉
〈RT p,R−1en〉R
−1en.
Since R−1en = 1n1, this establishes the claim. Therefore R
−1Q(∇yvε) = Q(RT∇xuε) and we have∑
ξ∈Q(∇yvε)
〈∇2yvεξ, ξ〉 =
∑
η∈Q(∇xuε)
〈∇2xuε η, η〉.
Combining this with (4.36) we have
(4.38) uε,t +
1
2d+1
∑
η∈Q(∇uε)
〈∇2uε η, η〉 = O(ε).
Since v(y, 1) = g(R−1y) we have the final time condition u(x, 1) = g(x). By (4.27) we have
〈∇uε,1〉 = nvyn ≥ θ.
Therefore uε is θ-increasing. Sending ε → 0 we find that uε → u, where u is the viscosity solution
of (1.8), which completes the proof. 
5. Convergence proofs
We now give the proofs of our main convergence results. The proofs rely on a common lemma.
Lemma 5.1. Assume (E1) holds. Let N ≥ 1, k ≥ d + 1, and set ε = N−1/2. Let (x0, t0) ∈
R
n × [0, 1] and let ϕ ∈ C3,2(Rn × [0, t0]). Assume there exists γ > 0 such that ϕxi(x0, t0) ≥ γ for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and set
ct = sup
t∈[0,t0]
|ϕtt(x0, t)|, cx,2 = sup
x∈Rn
|ξ|=1
|ϕξξ(x, t0)|, and cx,3 = sup
x∈Rn
|ξ|=1
|ϕξξξ(x, t0)|.
There exists c > 0, depending only on n, such that when cx,2kε ≤ c ϑqγ and t0 − kε2 ≥ 0 the
following hold.
(i) If
ϕt(x0, t0) +
1
2d+1
∑
η∈Q(∇ϕ(x0,t0))
〈∇2ϕ(x0, t0)η, η〉 ≤ 0
then
u+N (x0, t0 − kε2)− ϕ(x0, t0 − kε2) ≤ sup
x∈B(x0,2kε
√
n)
(u+N (x, t0)− ϕ(x, t0))
+ C
(
cx,2dε
2 + c2x,2γ
−1k2ε3 + cx,3k3ε3 + ctk2ε4
)
.
(ii) If
ϕt(x0, t0) +
1
2d+1
∑
η∈Q(∇ϕ(x0,t0))
〈∇2ϕ(x0, t0)η, η〉 ≥ 0
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then
u−N (x0, t0 − kε2)− ϕ(x0, t0 − kε2) ≥ inf
x∈B(x0,2kε
√
n)
(u−N (x, t0)− ϕ(x, t0))
− C (cx,2dε2 + c2x,2γ−1k2ε3 + cx,3k3ε3 + ctk2ε4) .
Proof. We will prove (i); the proof of (ii) is similar. Let us write
M = sup
x∈B(x0,2kε
√
n)
(u+N (x, t0)− ϕ(x, t0)).
Let m ∈ Bd such that
u+N (x, t0 − kε2) = uN (x0, t0 − kε2;m).
Then by Proposition 2.3 we have
u+N (x0, t0 − kε2) = uN (x0, t0 − kε2;m)
= min
|f1|≤1
max
b1=±1
· · · min
|fk|≤1
max
bk=±1
{
uN
(
x0 + ε
k∑
i=1
biδi, t0;m
k+1
)}
≤ min
|f1|≤1
max
b1=±1
· · · min
|fk|≤1
max
bk=±1
{
u+N
(
x0 + ε
k∑
i=1
biδi, t0
)}
≤ min
|f1|≤1
max
b1=±1
· · · min
|fk|≤1
max
bk=±1
{
ϕ
(
x0 + ε
k∑
i=1
biδi, t0
)}
+M,
where m1 = m, mi+1 = mi|bi, and δi = q(mi)− 1fi. Taylor expanding ϕ we have
ϕ
(
x0 + ε
k∑
i=1
biδi, t0
)
= ϕ(x0, t0) + ε
k∑
i=1
bi〈∇ϕ, δi〉+ ε
2
2
k∑
i,j=1
bibj〈∇2ϕδi, δj〉+O(cx,3k3ε3),
where ∇ϕ and ∇2ϕ are evaluated at (x0, t0). We also have
ϕ(x0, t0) = ϕ(x0, t0 − kε2) + kε2ϕt(x0, t0) +O(ctk2ε4).
Plugging this in above and invoking Theorem 3.2 we obtain
u+N (x0, t0 − kε2)− ϕ(x0, t0 − kε2)
≤ kε2ϕt(x0, t0) + min|f1|≤1 maxb1=±1 · · · min|fk|≤1 maxbk=±1
ε
k∑
i=1
bi〈∇ϕ, δi〉+ ε
2
2
k∑
i,j=1
bibj〈∇2 δi, δj〉

+ C(cx,3k
3ε3 + ctk
2ε4) +M
= kε2ϕt(x0, t0) + ε
2Lk,ε(∇2ϕ(x0, t0),∇ϕ(x0, t0),m) +C(cx,3k3ε3 + ctk2ε4) +M
≤ kε2
ϕt + 1
2d+1
∑
η∈Q(∇u)
〈∇2ϕη, η〉
 + C (cx,2dε2 + c2x,2γ−1k2ε3 + cx,3k3ε3 + ctk2ε4)+M
= C
(
cx,2dε
2 + c2x,2γ
−1k2ε3 + cx,3k3ε3 + ctk2ε4
)
+M,
provided cx,2kε ≤ c ϑqγ, which completes the proof. 
We now give the proof of Theorem 1.2.
Proof of Theorem 1.2. We first assume g ∈ C4(Rn) with [g]C4(Rn) < ∞. Since (G1) holds, we can
apply Theorem 4.14 to show that u ∈ C4,2(Rn × [0, 1]) and the constants ct, cx,2 and cx,3 from
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Lemma 5.1 are uniformly bounded depending only on [g]C4(Rn) and θg. We continue to denote these
constants for completeness, using the definitions
ct = sup
Rn×[0,1]
|utt(x, t)|, cx,2 = sup
Rn×[0,1]
max
|ξ|=1
|uξξ|, and cx,3 = sup
Rn×[0,1]
max
|ξ|=1
|uξξξ|.
Set ε = N−1/2 for convenience. By Definition (1.1) and equation (1.6), for any 0 ≤ j ≤ N we
have
uN (x, 1− jε2;m) = εVN (ε−1x, ⌈N(1 − jε2)⌉;m)
= εVN (ε
−1x,N − j;m)
= ε min
|fN−j |≤1
max
bN−j=±1
· · · min
|fN−1|≤1
max
bN−1=±1
g
ε−1x+ N−1∑
i=N−j
bi(q(m
i)− fi1)

≤ ε(g(ε−1x) +CLip(g)j) = g(x) + CLip(g)jε,
due to (G2). Therefore, for 0 ≤ j ≤ k we have
u+N (x, 1− jε2)− g(x) ≤ CLip(g)kε.
Since |ut| ≤ Ccx,2, with C depending only on n, we have
g(x) − u(x, 1− t) = u(x, 1)− u(x, 1 − t) ≤ Ccx,2t.
Therefore, for 0 ≤ j ≤ k we have
u+N (x, 1− jε2)− u(x, 1− jε2) = u+N (x, 1 − jε2)− g(x) + g(x) − u(x, 1 − jε2)(5.1)
≤ C(Lip(g)kε + cx,2kε2).
Since (G1) holds, Proposition 4.7 (ii) yields uxi ≥ θg for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Thus, we can apply
Lemma 5.1 with ϕ = u and γ = θg to find that
sup
x∈Rn
(u+N (x, t− kε2)− u(x, t− kε2)) ≤ sup
x∈Rn
(u+N (x, t)− u(x, t))(5.2)
+ C
(
cx,2dε
2 + c2x,2θ
−1
g k
2ε3 + cx,3k
3ε3 + ctk
2ε4
)
for all 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 and d + 1 ≤ k ≤ Cc−1x,2ϑqθgε−1 for which t − kε2 ≥ 0. We recall ϑq is defined in
(1.5). Now fix 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1 and ℓ ∈ N and apply (5.1) and then (5.2) ℓ times to obtain
sup
x∈Rn
(u+N (x, 1− (j + ℓk)ε2)− u(x, 1 − (j + ℓk)ε2)) ≤ Cℓ
(
cx,2dε
2 + c2x,2θ
−1
g k
2ε3 + cx,3k
3ε3 + ctk
2ε4
)
+ C(Lip(g)kε + cx,2kε
2),
provided t − (j + ℓk)ε2 ≤ 1. For every t ∈ [0, 1], ⌈t⌉ = 1 − (j + ℓk)ε2 for some 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1 and
ℓ ∈ N. Hence, we obtain for any t ∈ [0, 1] that
sup
x∈Rn
(u+N (x, t)− u(x, t)) ≤ C(1− t)
(
d
k
cx,2 + c
2
x,2θ
−1
g kε+ cx,3k
2ε+ ctkε
2
)
+C(Lip(g)kε+ cx,2kε
2).
Optimizing over k yields k = ⌈d1/3ε−1/3⌉, and so
sup
x∈Rn
(u+N (x, t)− u(x, t)) ≤ C(1− t)d2/3ε1/3
(
cx,2 + cx,3 + c
2
x,2θ
−1
g ε
1/3 + ctε
4/3
)
+ Cd1/3ε2/3(Lip(g) + cx,2ε),
PREDICTION WITH HISTORY-DEPENDENT EXPERTS 33
provided d + 1 ≤ d1/3ε−1/3 ≤ Cc−1x,2ϑqθgε−1. This is equivalent to ε ≤ d/(d + 1)3 and ε2/3 ≤
Cd−1/3c−1x,2ϑqθg; in other words
ε ≤ min
{
d
(d+ 1)3
, Cd−1/2(c−1x,2θgϑq)
3/2
}
,
which is equivalent to (1.10), after allowing C to depend on cx,2 and recalling ε = N
−1/2.
A similar argument shows that
inf
x∈Rn
(u−N (x, t)− u(x, t)) ≥ −C(1− t)d2/3ε1/3
(
cx,2 + cx,3 + c
2
x,2θ
−1
g ε
1/3 + ctε
4/3
)
− Cd1/3ε2/3(Lip(g) + cx,2ε).
This completes the proof in the case that g ∈ C4(Rn), upon allowing C to depend on [g]C4(Rn) and
θg.
If g is uniformly continuous, then we let δ > 0 and define gδ = ηδ ∗ g, where ηδ is a standard
mollifier with bandwidth δ > 0. By the uniform continuity of g, gδ → g uniformly on Rn as δ → 0+.
We define
uδN (x, t;m) = min|f⌈Nt⌉|≤1
max
b⌈Nt⌉=±1
· · · min
|fN−1|≤1
max
bN−1=±1
gδ
x+N−1/2 N−1∑
i=⌈Nt⌉
bi(q(m
i)− fi1)
 ,
where m1 = m and mi+1 = mi|bi. Since uN = u0N we have
(5.3) |uN − uδN | ≤ ‖g − gδ‖L∞(Rn).
Since gδ ∈ C∞(Rn) and (G1) holds, the argument above yields that uδN → uδ uniformly on Rn×[0, 1]
as N →∞, where uδ is the viscosity solution of
(5.4)

uδt +
1
2d+1
∑
η∈Q(∇uδ)
〈∇2uδ η, η〉 = 0, in Rn × (0, 1)
uδ = gδ, on Rn × {t = 1}.
By the comparison principle (Theorem 4.4), we have
‖u− uδ‖L∞(Rn×[0,1]) ≤ ‖g − gδ‖L∞(Rn).
Combining this with (5.3) and the triangle inequality we have
‖u±N − u‖L∞(Rn×[0,1]) ≤ 2‖g − gδ‖L∞(RN ) + max
m∈Bd
‖uδN (·, ·;m) − uδ‖L∞(Rn×[0,1]).
In particular,
lim sup
N→∞
‖uN − u‖L∞(Rn×[0,1]) ≤ 2‖g − gδ‖L∞(RN )
for all δ > 0. Sending δ → 0 completes the proof. 
We now give the proof of Theorem 1.3.
Proof of Theorem 1.3. By Theorem 4.12, u ∈ C∞(Rn × [0, 1)). As in the proof of Theorem 1.2 we
have
u+N (x, 1− jε2)− g(x) ≤ CLip(g)jε
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for all 0 ≤ j ≤ N . Due to (4.15) from Theorem 4.12, we have
g(x)− u(x, 1 − t) = u(x, 1) − u(x, 1− t)
=
∫ 1
1−t
ut(x, s) ds
≤ CLip(g)
∫ 1
1−t
1√
1− s ds = 2CLip(g)
√
t,
for all t > 0. Let M ≥ 1, to be determined later. Then for all 0 ≤ j ≤ 2M we have
u+N (x, 1− jε2)− u(x, 1− jε2) = u+N (x, 1 − jε2)− g(x) + g(x) − u(x, 1 − jε2)(5.5)
≤ CLip(g)jε + 2CLip(g)
√
jε ≤ CLip(g)Mε.
As in the proof of Theorem 1.2, we now apply Lemma 5.1 with ϕ = u and γ = θg for t ≤ 1−Mε2.
Due to Theorem 4.12, Lemma 5.1 yields
(5.6) sup
x∈Rn
(u+N (x, t−kε2)−u(x, t−kε2)) ≤ sup
x∈Rn
(u+N (x, t)−u(x, t))+C
(
cx,2dε
2 + cx,3k
3ε3 + ctk
2ε4
)
for all k ≥ d+ 1 satisfying t− kε2 ≥ 0 and
(5.7) cx,2kε ≤ Cϑqθg,
where
ct =
CLip(g)
(1− t)3/2 , cx,2 =
CLip(g)√
(1− t)λr
, and cx,3 =
CLip(g)
(1− t)λr .
Note we can omit the error term c2x,2θ
−1
g k
2ε3 due to (G3) and Remark 3.4. Upon restricting t ≤
1−Mε2, we have cx,2 ≤ CLip(g)√Mε2λr , and so then (5.7) becomes
(5.8) k ≤ Cθgϑq
√
Mλr
Lip(g)
.
We assume from now on that k,M ∈ N satisfy M ≥ k ≥ d+ 1 and (5.8) holds.
Let 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1 and ℓ ≥ 1. Then by applying (5.5) and then (5.6) ℓ times, we obtain
sup
x∈Rn
(u+N (x, 1− (M + j + ℓk)ε2)− u(x, 1− (M + j + ℓk)ε2))(5.9)
≤ CLip(g)Mε + CLip(g)
ℓ−1∑
i=0
[
dε2√
(M + j + ik)ε2λr
+
k3ε3
(M + j + ik)ε2λr
+
k2ε4
((M + j + ik)ε2)3/2
]
= CLip(g)Mε + CLip(g)
ℓ−1∑
i=0
[
dε√
(M + j + ik)λr
+
k3ε
(M + j + ik)λr
+
k2ε
(M + j + ik)3/2
]
.
Since ℓ ≥ 1 and M ≥ k we have
ℓ−1∑
i=0
1√
M + j + ik
≤ 1√
k
+
1√
k
ℓ−1∑
i=1
1√
i
≤ 1√
k
+
1√
k
∫ ℓ−1
0
1√
x
dx ≤ C
√
ℓ
k
,
ℓ−1∑
i=0
1
M + j + ik
≤ 1
k
+
1
k
ℓ−1∑
i=1
1
i
≤ C(log(ℓ+ 1))
k
,
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and
ℓ−1∑
i=0
1
(M + j + ik)3/2
≤ 1
k3/2
+
1
k3/2
ℓ−1∑
i=1
1
i3/2
≤ C
k3/2
.
Inserting these bounds into (5.9) we have
sup
x∈Rn
(u+N (x, 1 − (M + j + ℓk)ε2)− u(x, 1− (M + j + ℓk)ε2))
≤ CLip(g)Mε + CLip(g)
(
dε
√
ℓ
kλr
+
k2ε log(ℓ+ 1)
λr
+
√
kε
)
.
Now, every t ∈ [0, 1 − 2Mε2] satisfies ⌈t⌉ = 1− (M + j + ℓk)ε2 for some 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1 and ℓ ≥ 1.
Hence, we can use ℓkε2 ≤ 1 above to obtain
sup
x∈Rn
(u+N (x, t)− u(x, t)) ≤ CLip(g)Mε + CLip(g)
(
d
k
√
λr
+
k2ε
λr
log
(
1 +
1
kε2
)
+
√
kε
)
for all t ∈ [0, 1−2Mε2 ]. The estimate above also holds for t ∈ [1−2Mε2, 1], due to (5.5). Optimizing
over k we have k = ⌈d1/3λ1/6r ε−1/3⌉ which yields
sup
x∈Rn
(u+N (x, t)− u(x, t)) ≤ CLip(g)M + CLip(g)
(
1 + log
(
1 + d−1/3λ−1/6r ε
−5/3
))
λ−2/3r d
2/3ε1/3.
To ensure that (5.8) holds and M ≥ k, we choose
M =
k2Lip(g)2
C2θ2gϑ
2
qλr
=
d2/3λ
−2/3
r ε−2/3Lip(g)2
C2θ2gϑ
2
q
,
where C is given in (5.8), and we require that
(5.10) 1 ≤ M
k
=
kLip(g)2
C2θ2gϑ
2
qλr
⇐⇒ k ≥ C
2θ2gϑ
2
qλr
Lip(g)2
.
This yields
sup
x∈Rn
(u+N (x, t)− u(x, t)) ≤ CLip(g)
(
1 +
Lip(g)2
θ2gϑ
2
q
+ log
(
1 + d−1/3λ−1/6r ε
−5/3
))
λ−2/3r d
2/3ε1/3.
Since ϑq ≤ 2n, λr ≤ 1 and θg ≤ 1n , the condition k ≥ 4C
2
Lip(g)2
implies (5.10). In fact, by (G3) we
have Lip(g) ≥ 1/√n and so k ≥ 4nC2 implies (5.10). Since k = ⌈d1/3λ1/6r ε−1/3⌉ this amounts to
ε ≤ c dλ1/2r for c > 0. Similarly, the condition k ≥ d+ 1 amounts to ε ≤ dλ1/2r /(d+ 1)3, and so we
require
ε ≤ dλ1/2r min
{
c,
1
(d+ 1)3
}
.
Since we can take c < 1, the condition above is implied by the restriction ε ≤ c dλ1/2r(d+1)3 , This is
equivalent to (1.13) since ε = N−1/2.
A similar argument yields
inf
x∈Rn
(u−N (x, t)− u(x, t)) ≥ −CLip(g)
(
1 +
Lip(g)2
θ2gϑ
2
q
+ log
(
1 + d−1/3λ−1/6r ε
−5/3
))
λ−2/3r d
2/3ε1/3
for all t ∈ [0, 1], under the same condition on ε. This completes the proof. 
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6. Conclusion
This paper addresses the history-dependent prediction problem in the general case of any number
of experts n ≥ 2 and any d ≥ 1 days of history. We prove that the rescaled value function (1.6)
converges to the unique solution of a degenerate elliptic PDE (1.8), with convergence rates of
O(N−1/6), up to logarithmic factors. Using this result, we derived strategies for the investor that
are provably asymptotically optimal. Future work will look at numerical methods for solving the
PDE (1.8) in order to use these results in practice, and whether we can improve the convergence
rates to O(N−1/2) to match the results from prior work [13] for n = 2 and d ≤ 4.
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